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Regulation 2.0: The Marriage of New
Governance and Lex Informatica
Abbey Stemler*

ABSTRACT

Throughout history, disruptive technologies have transformed
industry and signaled the destruction or creation of regulatory
structures.
When crafting regulations, governments often utilize
Regulation 1.0 approaches, characterizedby top-down design standards
that dictate exactly how the regulated must act in order to prevent
market failures. Regulation 1.0 increases barriersto entry and decreases
the room for business experimentation. Regulation 2.0, by contrast, is a
theoretical approach for regulating companies that rely on platformmediated networks. It marries New Governance theory and the concept
of lex informatica. This marriage allows for the collaborative creation
of design standards that are then enforced through mediating
technologies. Regulation 2.0 is ideal for regulatingthe sharingeconomy
in particular,as it is powered by technology-drivenfeedback loops. The
shift from Regulation 1.0 to Regulation 2.0 will help regulators
meaningfully collaborate with stakeholders and complete the heavy
lifting required to effectively turn code into law and efficiently achieve
the desired ends of regulation.
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Genuine novelty knows no rules. We cannot reduce to routine what we
do not yet know. Yet of course we cannot resist trying.
-Steven W. Usselman (discussing the regulation of railroads)'
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, disruptive technologies have transformed
industry and marked the destruction and creation of regulatory
structures. From the railroad to the Internet to the sequencing of the
human genome, regulators have had to experiment and stumble their
way to protect the public from the potentially negative consequences of
innovation. Regulatory response to innovation today is no different.
Society must devise ways to effectively regulate new technologies such
as drones, driverless cars, and tech-driven marketplaces collectively
known as the sharing economy. 2
Regulation is necessary because, according to the public interest
theory of regulation, markets are fragile. 3 Market failure can produce
inefficient, inequitable, and harmful results. When market failures
occur, consumers demand regulation as a corrective measure. For
example, cities in the United States have been regulating taxicabs with
safety, insurance, and service standards since the 1920s. 4 These
regulations came in response to the early days of dangerous cars and
inadequate compensation for accident victims. 5

When the invisible

hand fails to protect the public, governments may choose to regulate to
police the behavior of individuals and businesses.

1.

STEVEN W. USSELMAN, REGULATING RAILROAD INNOVATION: BUSINESS, TECHNOLOGY,

AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1840-1920, at 1 (2002).
2.
Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, FASTCOMPANY
(Nov.
21,
2013),
http://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shareddefinition#8 [https://perma.cclD8UC-P7R6]. The "sharing economy" goes by many names such as
"collaborative consumption," "the peer-to-peer economy," "the 1099 economy," etc. Id. This Article
uses the term "sharing economy" to refer to the peer-to-peer networks facilitated by platforms that
allow people to profit from their excess capacity.
3.
Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
335, 335-36 (1974). The "public interest theory" of regulation posits that regulation emerges in
situations of market failure as a response to public demand. Id.
4.
See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation & Reregulation:
The Paradoxof Market Failure, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 75 (1996).
5.
See id. at 76-77.
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Market failures in the 21st Century's technology-driven
environment are increasingly difficult to detect and correct. Gone are
the days of discrete and physical industries, like the taxi industry, that
can be tamed with licenses and inspections. Now, many technology
companies use platform-mediated networks. 6 These are networks with
a "triangular pattern of relationships in which two parties to a
transaction-network users-each access a common platform that
facilitates their transaction."7 Companies that use platform-mediated
networks include EBay, Google, Facebook, American Express, Cisco,
UPS, Uber, and Airbnb. These companies, called "platforms" for the
purposes of this Article, are dramatically lowering the barriers to
participation for users on both the supply and demand side of
transactions. This calls into question key assumptions about how firms
are organized and how they can be regulated.
Platforms use the Internet, complex algorithms, and big data to
transform and enhance our lives in previously inconceivable ways. So
while technology and regulation have always run at different speeds, in
today's age, the gap between the two is getting wider." Regulatory
agencies struggle to be nimble enough to keep up with the pace of
changing consumer markets. Unfortunately, they often default to
outmoded and ineffective approaches characterized by the old top-down
forms of regulation that utilize rigid design standards. 9 This type of
regulation, "Regulation 1.0," stifles innovation by increasing barriers to
entry and decreasing room for businesses to experiment. By contrast,
Regulation 2.0, as defined in this Article, utilizes New Governance
theory principles to develop regulating technologies based on the input
of multiple stakeholders.
New Governance has emerged as an umbrella term to refer to a
new approach in legal scholarship that encourages experimental and
flexible regulatory systems.10 It developed as a theory in response to
popular frustrations about the cost and effectiveness of government
programs, changes in technology, economic forces, globalization, and a

6.

Thomas R. Eisenmann, Module Note, Platform-Mediated Networks: Definition and

Core Concepts, HARV. BUS. REV., rev. Oct. 2007, at 1.

Id. at 20.
7.
Larry Downes, Managingthe Big Bang: The Regulator'sDilemma, 34 DEMOCRACY J.
8.
14, 18 (2014).
9.

STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 105 (1982). Design standards

specify exactly how a regulated entity should achieve compliance in order to address market
failures. Id.
See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-BasedSecurities
10.
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 6-11 (2008). Other terms for New Governance concepts include
"democratic experimentalism," "reflexive law," "responsive regulation," and "network governance."
Id.; see infra Part II.A.
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need to make regulatory systems more innovation-friendly.1 1 New
Governance is the antithesis to the expert-centered, command-andcontrol regulatory regime of the New Deal. New Governance
appreciates the complex nature of problems facing modern economies
and acknowledges the fact that these problems "have become too
complex for government to handle on its own, because disagreements
exist about the proper ends of public action, and because government
increasingly lacks the authority to enforce its will on other crucial
actors without giving them a meaningful seat at the table." 12 New
Governance design principles focus on privileging performance
standards over design standards, pulling industry experience into the
regulatory decision making process, and relying on audited selfregulation. 13
Lex informatica, on the other hand, relates to the idea that
technological capabilities and system design choices can regulate
participant behavior to protect consumers. 14 That is, regulation built
into the technical architecture of user-interfaces can both prevent,
certain user actions (e.g. access to private information) and
instantaneously punish behavior (e.g. kicking users off sharing
economy platforms for fraudulent behavior). The resulting offspring of

11.
David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation:
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 542-43 (2007)
(describing the emergence of New Governance and how its "development may be attributed to very

basic changes in economy, polity and society, as well as to more technical innovations in public
administration"); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in ContemporaryLegal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 352 (2004) [hereinafter Lobel, The Renew
Deal] (claiming new governance "aims to tie developments in technology, globalization,
communications, economic organization, and privatization, as well as the collapse of states and

ideologies, the unification of regimes like the European Union, and the rise of nonstate and
stateless actors in both peace and war together with developments in legal and democratic theory,
including the decline of unified theories and the dissatisfaction with oppositional and fragmented
schools"); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of PublicAction: An Introduction,

28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1612 (2001) (describing how New Governance theory emerged because
of popular frustrations with government and a new-found faith in liberal economic theories).
12.
Salamon, supra note 11, at 1623.
13.
Ford, supra note 10 (describing the relationship between principles-based securities
regulation and New Governance theory); IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 54-56 (1992) (describing a tripartite

regulatory enforcement strategy that employs private interest groups as monitors); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, "New Governance"in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to
Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 478 (2004) (stressing experimentation and
negotiation in New Governance approaches); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1997) (describing "collaborative governance" in
administrative rulemaking as, among other things, a process characterized by: participation by
interested and affected parties in all stages of the decision-making process; accountability that
transcends traditional public and private roles in governance; and a flexible, engaged regulator
that facilitates multi-stakeholder negotiations and provides appropriate incentives).
14.
See infra Part II.C.
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New Governance and lex informatica is Regulation 2.0.15 Regulation
2.0, in theory, incorporates New Governance design principles and
technology to efficiently police behavior via performance standards.
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate how the
combination of New Governance theory and lex informatica can address
problems related to emerging and disruptive platforms, particularly
those related to the sharing economy. Part I of this Article discusses
why we attempt to regulate market failure. It then identifies the
concept of Regulation 1.0, which is characterized by command-andcontrol regulation that utilizes design standards-most commonly in
the form of licensing requirements. Part I concludes by demonstrating
how Regulation 1.0 stifles innovation. As an alternative to Regulation
1.0, Part II blends principles of New Governance and lex informaticato
develop a theoretical framework for Regulation 2.0. In particular, it
incorporates technology-driven feedback loops that allow for the
instantaneous monitoring and regulation of behavior. Finally, Part III
concludes by applying the Regulation 2.0 model to the sharing economy.
II. MARKET FAILURES AND REGULATION 1.0
The volume and scope of regulation 16 has swollen since 1887,
when the federal government of the United States established the first
modern regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), to regulate railroads.1 7 Regulation is now omnipresent in our
lives: from our houses, whose construction is subject to a robust set of
building codes, to our cars, which are made, sold, driven, and
maintained under a multitude of government rules. The justifications
for regulation are based on the alleged inability of the marketplace to
deal with structural problems known as market failures. 18 However, in
practice, regulation can fail to live up to the normative goals of those
For example, well-intended consumer protection
who seek it.
regulations can stifle innovation by creating regulatory capture and
This is particularly true when
increasing compliance burdens.

15.
Nick Grossman, The Regulation 2.0 Challenge, SLOW HUNCH (Dec. 4, 2013),
[https://perma.cc/XM4Rhttp://www.nickgrossman.is/2013/12/04/the-regulation-2-0-challenge/
W6LP] (discussing the concept and the related term "Regulation 2.0," perhaps, for the first time).
16.

Regulation, WEBSTER'S II RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY (2005)

(defining

"regulation" as "[a] principle, rule, or law designed for controlling or governing behavior").
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
17.
18.
See BREYER, supra note 9, at 15-35; ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 65-70, 172-250 (1971).
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regulators utilize Regulation 1.0 or top-down regulations that rely on
design standards that are enforced via inspection and punishment.1 9
A. Why We Regulate
The public interest theory of regulation suggests that markets
are generally efficient, meaning that markets put scarce resources to
their best use because free exchange creates signals about which goods
and services are valuable and how difficult they are to bring to
market. 20 These signals, captured in the price system, direct market
players to fulfill the needs and desires of others.2 1
However,
intervention is necessary when markets deviate from perfect market
conditions. 22 More specifically, "market failure" occurs when a system
of price-market institutions fails to stop "undesirable" activities, where
the desirability of an activity is assessed in relation to what is Pareto
optimal. 23
Common
market
failures
include
monopolies;
uncompensated negative externalities, and asymmetrical information.,
1. Monopolies
Various types of monopolies exist. The first is a sanctioned
monopoly where one firm owns valuable intellectual property, such as
patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, which legally entitles it to
prohibit others from benefiting from the property as a reward for
innovation or creativity. The second type is unsanctioned and arises as
a result of anticompetitive action, such as collusion, where one seller or

19.
This gross simplification of New Deal-like regulations is designed for explanatory
purposes. Regulation has been subject to academic debate and discourse for centuries, it is thus
complex and difficult to precisely characterize or define. This Article only means to describe
Regulation 1.0 so as to contrast it with Regulation 2.0. This Article fully realizes the shift from
Regulation 1.0 to 2.0 has been a slow evolution, with an infinite number of Regulation 1 + O.x's
along the way.
20.

See SUSAN DUDLEY & JERRY BRITO, REGULATION: A PRIMER 12 (2d ed. 2012). There

are many criticisms of the public interest theory, particularly from the Chicago School of Law and
Economics. Andrei Shleifer, UnderstandingRegulation, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 439, 440 (2005). The
criticisms and additional theories of regulation are beyond the scope of this Article, including the
contract theory associated with Coase and the capture theory associated with Stigler. See generally
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); George Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
21.

Invisible

Hand,

INVESTOPEDIA.COM,

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i

/invisiblehand.asp [https://perma.cc/K5K3-5D67].
22.

See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 63-64 (reprt. 2005) (1920).

23.
Pareto optimality is achieved when it is impossible to make one person better off
without making someone else worse off. Barbara Ann White, Economic Efficiency and the
Parametersof Fairness:A Marriageof MarketplaceMorals and the Ethic of Care, 15 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 1, 28 (2005) (defining Pareto optimality).
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group of sellers produces for an entire market or industry. 24 Without a
sufficient substitute for consumers, competition is deficient and thus
the market fails. 25 The effects of an anticompetitive monopoly are
reduced output, higher prices, and unjust income transfer from
consumers to producers. 26 In response to these monopolies, regulators
use antitrust laws to ensure that the business environment is conducive
to competition.
The third type of monopoly is a natural monopoly, which occurs
when one firm dominates a market because there are extremely high
fixed costs of distribution. Railways are a typical example of a natural
monopoly because the costs of laying track and building a network, as
well as the cost of buying or leasing trains, prohibit or deter the entry
of competitors. In these situations, antitrust law is undesirable, as
restoration of competition in a natural monopoly would cause the
Therefore, regulators choose
inefficient duplication of efforts.
27
alternative approaches, such as regulating prices, quality, and output.
2. Uncompensated Negative Externalities
A considerable amount of regulation is justified on the grounds
unregulated price of a good does not reflect the negative
the
that
externalities or spillovers, which make up the true cost to society of
producing the good. 28 A classic example of uncompensated negative
externalities involves pollution. 29 If carbon emissions from factories are
not internalized, industry thrives at the expense of communities by
lowering the quality of life for inhabitants, increasing healthcare cost,
and reducing production opportunities, such as tourism. Since the
indirect costs in a negative externality situation are not borne by the
producer, and therefore not passed on to the end user of the goods
produced by the producer, regulation is necessary in the form of
taxation and quantity restrictions. 30 Taxation attempts force producers
to internalize the effects of their activities and quantity restrictions

FAILURE:
MARKET
FAILURE VERSUS
GOVERNMENT
WINSTON,
CLIFFORD
24.
MICROECONOMICS POLICY RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 17 (2006).
ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND
25.
PRACTICE 16 (2d ed. 2012).

See Alan J. Meese, Reframing the (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare and
26.
Total Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2197, 2198 (2013).
27.

BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 16.

28.

Id at 18.

Id.
29.
Thomas Helbling, Externalities: Prices Do Not Capture All Costs, INT'L MONETARY
30.
[https://perma.cc/Q93NFUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/external.htm
YQEU] (last updated Mar. 28, 2012).
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dictate how much of a negative externality can be produced (e.g. how
much carbon can be produced by a firm). 31
3. Asymmetrical Information
For a competitive market to function well, buyers must have
sufficient information to evaluate competing products or services. 32
However, the market may fail to produce adequate information for a
number of reasons: (1) information may cost money to produce, (2)
incentives to produce the information may be low, and (3) there may be
incentives to falsify information. 33
Inadequate information can cause adverse selection, which is
the process by which businesses exploit the information gap between
them and consumers. 34 To deal with the consequences of adverse
selection, regulators employ a variety of tactics: "these tactics range
from consumer empowerment (demand-side measures), which
enhances the quality or type of information about products and ensure
that consumer contracts are fair, to focusing on modifying firm behavior
(supply-side measures), mandating product standards or encouraging
the development of codes of conduct." 35 For example, Congress
responded to the Great Depression, a market failure brought on in part
by exaggerated claims about the profit potential of securities, with the
Securities Act. 3 6 The Securities Act is designed to focus not on the
merits of investments but rather on disclosure of information about
investments. 37 The 1933 Congress believed that full and truthful
disclosure would allow individuals to make informed investment
decisions.
As Justice Brandeis put it, "[S]unlight is the best
disinfectant." 38

31.

32.
(1945).

BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 18.

See Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcON. REV. 519, 519

33.

BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 18.

34.

Id.

35.

ORGANISATION

FOR ECONOMIC

CO-OPERATION

AND

DEVELOPMENT,

CONSUMER

POLICY TOOLKIT 4 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/sti/consumer/45098058.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CBS7QKR].
36.
See Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities"Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1340, 1340-41
(1966). See generally FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH (1939) (discussing the
impact of the 1933 Act); William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal SecuritiesAct of 1933,
43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933) (providing an overview of the 1933 Act as originally enacted).
37.
Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical
Introduction to the SecuritiesAct of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
329, 344 (1988).

38.
Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the
Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful
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Information asymmetry can also cause moral hazard, which
occurs when one trading partner takes more risks because the other
trading partner bears the cost of those risks. 39 For example, firms
receiving tax breaks and insurance payouts may take cybersecurity
concerns less seriously because they do not experience the full cost of
those risks. 40 To prevent the moral hazard problem, regulators try to
shift risk back to the person or entity with the power to mitigate the
risk.
The above-mentioned market failures highlight how market
forces alone are unable to achieve desired societal outcomes. Simply
put, regulation is necessary because social and private costs and
benefits, and hence incentives, are misaligned. Such misalignment
41
leads to long and short-term problems for consumers.
B. Regulation 1.0: Design by Default
Before the New Deal, economic regulation was limited. There
given to freedom of contract and individual property
preference
was a
42
However, after the Great Depression, bodies of substantive
rights.
law were created to address the market failures discussed above. The
New Deal crystalized the modern era of regulation, which "reflected the
judgment that social subsystems are incapable of self-adjustment and
need to be ordered by a centralized authority." 43 Much of the modern
era regulations were produced under a command-and-control model
that "sought to set market rates, limit entry into industries, and create
These
standards for the production of goods and services."44
main
three
and
its
1.0
characteristics embody the idea of Regulation
components: top-down regulation crafting, design standards, and expost enforcement.

Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1741 (2012) (explaining how the 1933 Congress believed that full
and truthful disclosure would allow individuals to make informed decisions).
39.

PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008, at

63 (2009).
40.

Liam M.D. Bailey, Mitigating Moral Hazard in Cyber-Risk Insurance, 3 J.L. & CYBER

WARFARE 1, 6 (2014).

For simplicity, this Article does not explore the various alternative rationales for
41.
regulation, such as distributional justice, rights protection, and citizenship. Governments, indeed,
regulate on a host of matters to further social policies unrelated to market concerns, such as the
prevention of discrimination.
42.
Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 11, at 362.
43.
See id. at 363.
44.
See id. at 379 (citing Peter H. Schuck, The Politics of Regulation, in THE LIMITS OF
LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 117, 121 (2000)).
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Top-down regulation crafting relies on a few "well-educated,
specially trained, and publically appointed professionals." 45 It is a slow
and deliberative process of fact-finding and theorizing about the "best"
way to regulate behavior. It does not involve dynamic participation
among stakeholders nor account for conflict and compromise. The
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 46 which established the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) within the
Labor Department, is a classic example of top-down regulation. 47
OSHA was granted broad power to regulate workplace safety across all
industries, and it promulgated rules that established standards for
issues like exposure to toxins. The Agency enforced these standards via
quasi-random inspections and prosecution for violations, and its
practices epitomized the dissatisfaction with the top-down regulatory
model.48
Design standards specify exactly how a regulated entity should
behave to prevent market failure. 49 Companies must figure out how to
comply with design standards before engaging in a regulated activity.
They then must get the appropriate stamp of approval or license from
government. For instance, every taxi in New York City must undergo
a 200-point inspection three times a year, and in order to become
licensed, drivers must be at least nineteen years old, pass a criminal
background check, go to taxi school, show proficiency in English, and
prove a working knowledge of New York City streets.5 0 These design
standards serve gatekeeping functions that increase the costs and time
for bringing innovative products and services to market.
To create design standards, policymakers first see a market
failure, such as asymmetric information. 5 '
They then use a
preliminary, cost-benefit analysis to select the specific part of the
general problem that they should attack in order to obtain the greatest
improvement at the lowest cost. 5 2 Policymakers obtain information and
create a standard that would reduce the targeted adverse effects to an
economically reasonable level in the least expensive way available. 53
Next, they enforce the standards, developing means to ensure

45.
Id. at 371.
46.
Act of Dec. 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012)).
47.
See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 11, at 415.
48.
See id. at 416.
49.
See BREYER, supra note 9, at 105.
50.
Why
Are
NYC
Taxis
Regulated?,
CNBC
(July
18,
2014),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101848822 [https://perma.cc/5S4Q-WCNQ].
51.
BREYER, supra note 9, at 98.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
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Finally, they monitor enforcement, evaluate the
compliance. 54
standard's effectiveness, and revise it in light of their findings.55
Justice Breyer in his book Regulation and its Reform describes
several problems that "plague even the most competent administrators"
in the standard-setting process. 56 The most notable of these problems
relates to the information gathering needed to write sensible standards.
Often regulators gather information from industry, government staff,
independent consultants or academics, and consumers. However, each
method suffers from serious problems, such as self-interest, lack of
technical ability, expense, and anti-industry bias.
As a result,
regulators often make decisions on inadequate information, leading to
top-down design standards that are imperfect.
The third component of Regulation 1.0 relates to enforcement.
Standards may be enforced through ex-post criminal sanctions,
withdrawal of a license, civil fines, or adverse publicity.5 7 This type of
enforcement, however, is costly because it requires constant inspection
As Daniel Farber describes, negative slippage-the
and review.
disparity between regulatory mandates and actual enforcement-is
ubiquitous in these situations and results from weak enforcement by
regulators and noncompliance by private actors.58
Regulation 1.0 has been used to address the market failures for
decades-from anticompetitive monopolies, which are prohibited by the
Sherman Act, to the labeling requirements for consumer products.5 9
Regulation 1.0 dictates exactly how industry must behave. If industry
fails to live up to particular standards, and gets caught, a punishment
will be imposed. Regulation 1.0 is far from perfect at addressing market
failures and, as the section below describes, it can have negative effects
on innovation.
C. The Innovation Stifling Effects of Regulation 1.0
Regulation 1.0 can create various types of "government failure,"
which can repress innovation. 60 Innovation is a concept that is defined

54.
Id.
55.
Id.
Id. at 109-18.
56.
Id. at 98-99.
57.
Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative
58.
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 299 (1999).
59.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). The Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce." Id.
60.

Government failure occurs when government intervention threatens to cause or

causes a more inefficient allocation of goods and resources than an unregulated market for those
goods and resources. DAVID MOSS & JOHN CISTERNINO, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 7
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differently depending on context and the field in question, but generally
it relates to developing new solutions for existing problems and bringing
those solutions to market. 61 Innovation is a "complex and evolving
process that requires state intervention but which also can be easily
stifled if regulations are not permeable to change." 62 Regulation 1.0
impedes innovation in three ways: (1) regulatory delay, (2) regulatory
capture, and (3) compliance burdens. 63
1. Regulatory Delay
Regulatory delay relates to the time between a request for
regulatory approval for a product or service and its administrative
approval or enactment of the associated regulation. 64 If firms do not
know when and if their products or services will be regulated, the
incentives to invest in innovative ideas may decrease.6 5 For example,
the regulatory delay in the pharmaceutical industry comes from Food
and Drug Administration approval, thereby increasing the costs of
bringing a new drug to market. 66
Regulatory delay in the
telecommunications industry comes from the Federal Communications
Commission and state regulators. Voice messaging services, by way of
example, were delayed over ten years because of regulatory barriers
and hurdles. A study estimates that this delay cost consumers $100
billion.67
2. Regulatory Capture
Regulatory capture relates to the political corruption that causes
regulated industries to spend time and resources to influence

(2009) (stating that the term "government failure" has been used since the early 1960s to describe
the phenomenon of unintended consequences related to regulation).
61.

See Jan Fagerberg, Innovation:A Guide to the Literature, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK

OF INNOVATION 1 (Jan Fagerberg & David C. Mowery eds., 2007).
62.
Sofia Ranchordas, Innovation Experimentalism in the Age of the Sharing Economy,
19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 871, 876-77 (2015).
63.
For an excellent discussion of the relationship between innovation and the sharing
economy, see generally Sofia Ranchordas, Does SharingMean Caring?RegulatingInnovation in the
SharingEconomy, 16 MINN. J.L. Sol. & TECH. 413 (2015).
64.
See James E. Prieger, Regulatory Delay and the Timing of Product Innovation, 25
INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 219, 220 (2007).

65.
firms).
66.

Id. (examining how regulatory delays may negatively impact innovation by regulated
Id.

67.
JERRY HAUSMAN,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS

VALUING THE EFFECT OF REGULATION ON NEW SERVICES IN
3
(1997),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-

content/uploads/1997/01/1997_bpeamicrohausman.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6CT-9L7Z].
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regulators.6 8
Typically under the guise of consumer protection,
established industry participants create barriers to entry for new firms
by lobbying for regulations limiting entry into the marketplace. 69
These tactics take many forms, such as licensing requirements and
restrictions on quality. 70 This is particularly true within the sharing
economy, whose biggest competitors spend enormous amounts of
resources to advocate for tighter regulation. However, this is inefficient
because regulation designed to regulate quality and price is useful to
the regulated firms, but not necessarily useful for society as a whole. In
regulatory capture situations, less dynamic competition discourages
entrepreneurs from discovering new ways of doing business and
creating value for customers and pulls energy away from other
productive and perhaps innovative activities in existing firms. 7 1
3. Compliance Burdens
The third way regulation can stifle innovation is by placing
compliance burdens on firms. Compliance burdens can cause firms to
divert time and money from innovative activities toward compliance
efforts.7 2 For example, financial reporting regulation may cause firms
to redirect resources from their R&D divisions to their internal auditing
divisions. 73 These burdens can also make it economically infeasible for
innovative firms that rely on crowds to enter or create new markets.
For example, the United States has tried to regulate equity-based
In 2012 it passed the
crowdfunding through its securities laws.
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the "JOBS Act"). 74 Before the
JOBS Act, equity interests, as opposed to token rewards and such, were
likely to be classified as securities under the Securities Act of 1933 and
subsequent legislation, adding many additional (and often impractical)
reporting burdens on entrepreneurs. Therefore, both the equity-based
crowdfunding platforms and the start-ups that could potentially benefit

68.

LIAM

WREN-LEWIS,

REGULATORY

CAPTURE: RISKS AND

https://ecopub2.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/liam-on-capture.pdf
Id. at 8.
69.

SOLUTIONS

2

(2010),

[https://perma.cc/9CA2-LSZZ].

CHRISTOPHER KOOPMAN, MATTHEW MITCHELL, & ADAM THIERER, THE SHARING
70.
ECONOMY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION REGULATION: THE CASE FOR POLICY CHANGE 3-5 (2014),

[https://perma.cc/4CXPhttp://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Koopman-Sharing-Economy.pdf
A5FJ].
71.
LUKE A. STEWART, THE IMPACT OF REGULATION ON INNOVATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: A CROSS-INDUSTRY LITERATURE REVIEW 10 (2010), http://www.itif.org/files/201 1-impactregulation-innovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/LW4Q-ZEBZ].
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
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from this new form of fundraising were precluded from using this new
approach.
Regulatory delay, capture, and burdens all impact the ability of
entrepreneurs and established firms to innovate. Regulation 1.0 is
more likely to cause these government failures than Regulation 2.0
because decisions about regulation are being made slowly on top-down
bases with the input of very few participants. If industry is consulted
at all, the loudest voices are likely to come from incumbents instead of
innovative newcomers. Furthermore, to comply with design standards,
innovators have to get approval from government first or ask for
forgiveness later.
III. THE SHIFT FROM REGULATION 1.0 TO REGULATION 2.0
Regulation 1.0 often does not achieve its "public interest" aims.
And with technology and interconnectedness, commercial activity has
reached a new level of complexity that makes it impossible "to write
rules that cover the particulars of current circumstances in any sphere
of activity."7 5 Government policy needs to be quick, flexible, and
revisable to cope with an increasingly complex and unpredictable world.
With platform companies in particular, government policy needs to
move towards Regulation 2.0, which relies on New Governance
principles to design new technology-driven systems to govern behavior.
A. The Pillarsof New Governance
New Governance, 76 known by many different names, is the
movement that attempts to harness the power of new technologies,
market innovation, and civic engagement to allow stakeholders to
develop new ways to govern.7 7 It contrasts the traditional commandand-control regulation that has characterized Regulation 1.0 and moves
toward a "more participatory and collaborative model, in which

75.
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Experimentalist
Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 837 (2000) (arguing that drug courts are experimental and
need not face a strict trade off between efficacy and accountability).
76.
The term "new governance" first appeared in a 1996 article. R.A.W. Rhodes, The New
Governance: Governing Without Government, 44 POL. STUD. 652 (1996). In 2004, Orly Lobel
published the article that "sound[ed] a clear alarm" that the movement was growing within legal
literature." See Karkkainen, supra note 13, at 478.
77.
Orly Lobel argued that New Governance is an amalgamation of several scholarly
theories including: "reflexive law," "soft law," "collaborative governance," "democratic
experimentalism," "responsive regulation," "outsourcing regulation," "reconstitutive law," "postregulatory law," "revitalizing regulation," "regulatory pluralism," "decentering regulation," "metaregulation," "contractarian law," "communicative governance," and "negotiated governance."
Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 11, at 349-50.
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government, industry, and society share responsibility for achieving
policy goals."7 8 New Governance scholars are "engaged in developing a
broad menu of legal reform strategies that involve private industry and
nongovernmental actors in a variety of ways while maintaining the
necessary role of the state to aid weaker groups in order to promote
overall welfare and equity."7 9 In particular, New Governance offers a
vision of law and policy that draws on the comparative strengths of both
The leading regulatory design
private and public stakeholders.8 0
features of New Governance are discussed below. These factors include
privileging (1) performance standards over design standards, (2)
private actors in the standard setting process, and (3) audited selfregulation.
1. Privileging Performance Standards over Design Standards
Performance standards specify a desired outcome but leave the
specific measures to achieve that outcome to the discretion of the
regulated entity, such as a standard that states that a certain industry
must reduce carbon emissions by 50 percent by the year 2050.81
Performance-based regulation promotes flexibility and creativity
among those with the greatest understanding of relevant situations to
achieve specified goals. 82 In addition, performance standards directly
address market failures and are better able to account for changes in
the practices of regulated entities and empower innovation in
methods. 83 For example, the Nuclear Regulatory
compliance
Commission (NRC) and the Department of Transportation's Office of
Pipeline Safety have initiated risk-informed, performance-based
84
approaches to achieving their regulatory safety goals.

See id. at 344.
78.
Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and
79.
Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 983 (2007) [hereinafter Lobel, The Paradox].
Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
80.
OF GOVERNANCE 71 (David Levi-Four ed., 2012) [hereinafter Lobel, New Governance].
See, e.g., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., PERFORMANCE BASED REGULATIONS GUIDE (1998);
81.
BREYER, supra note 9, at 105; W. KIP Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY
IN THE WORKPLACE 128-29 (1983); Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation:

Prospects in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705, 711 (2003).
Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 11, at 391-92.
82.
83.

PAYPAL & EBAY INC, 21ST CENTURY REGULATION: PUTTING INNOVATION AT THE HEART

OF PAYMENTS REGULATION 17, http://www.ebaymainstreet.com/sites/default/files/PayPalPayment-Regulations-Booklet-US.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XQL-5V47].
See
84.
REGULATION

NUCLEAR REGULATORY
(2002),

COMM'N,

GUIDANCE FOR PERFORMANCE-BASED
http://www.nre.gov/reading-rm/doc-

collections/nuregs/brochures/brO3O3/brO3O3.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CMM-KEP3] (describing high
level principles for NRC's performance-based approach); Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity
Management in High Consequence Areas, 67 Fed. Reg. 2,136, 2,140 (Jan. 16, 2002) (to be codified
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Historically, performance standards, while theoretically
preferable, have been difficult to enforce because regulators lack the
technical knowledge to be able to measure, monitor, and revise the
standards. 85
However, the rapid development of technology is
diminishing these enforcement barriers.
2. Privileging Private Actors in the Standard Setting Process
Unlike the top-down, command-and-control characteristics of
Regulation 1.0, both regulators and a broad, decentralized stakeholder
group design performance standards. These stakeholders strengthen
the regulation process by capitalizing on their local knowledge and
expertise. As Cristie L. Ford describes in the context of securities
regulation:
[The] regulatory structure [of New Governance] spans the so-called public/private divide,
pulls industry experience into regulatory decision-making, and establishes robust ongoing
communication

mechanisms

(rather

than

an

information-hoarding,

adversarial

relationship) between industry and regulator. The regulator establishes broad policy
guidelines and regulatory goals for industry action. It cooperates with industry where
possible in determining means to achieve those goals. However, on the basis that industry
generally has access to superior contextual information, it refrains from describing the

specific content of those.principles, including the precise means by which industry ought
86
to achieve the articulated regulatory goals.

New governance is committed to collaboration. Industry and
individuals are not viewed as objects of regulation; rather participants
are viewed as "norm-generating subjects" meaning they are involved in
the process of developing norms of behavior in a given space.8 7 A good
example of this is President Obama's Executive Order 13563, which
promotes increased public participation throughout all stages of the
rulemaking process. 88 Agencies must provide searchable, online access
to proposed rules and allow for comment from the public at early stages
of rule development. The Obama Administration hoped this increases
"significantly the opportunities for public participation in the
rulemaking process." 89

at 49 C.F.R. pt. 195) (indicating that new regulation issued by the Office of Pipeline Safety, a part
of RSPA, was "written using a performance-based approach").
85.
See BREYER, supranote 9, at 105-06.
86.
Ford, supra note 9, at 28. Ford utilizes the term "principles-based regulation" in her
article. Id. It is essentially the same concept as performance-based regulation. See id.
87.
Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 11, at 377.
88.
Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 215, 217 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 101-02 (2012).
89.

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO OPEN GOVERNMENT: A STATUS

REPORT
30
(2011),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/opengov-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S5KN-BYN2].
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3. Privileging Audited Self-Regulation
While ultimate enforcement of performance standards remains
with the regulator, New Governance incorporates aspects of selfThe notion of selfregulation in order to promote compliance.9 0
Throughout history,
regulation is neither new nor revolutionary.
industry has developed its own standards, rules, and enforcement
practices through a variety of organizations to lower costs, avoid and
resolve conflicts, and ultimately to create consumer confidence. 91
E-commerce created a heightened interest in the concept of selfregulation. 92 The development of the Internet fundamentally changed
the way consumers buy and sell goods. 93 The marketplace no longer
consists solely of brick and mortar stores; now consumers can make
purchases online from complete strangers far away. This new way of
purchasing goods provoked much debate about the respective roles of
government, industry, and users in the Internet economy. 94
In July 1997, President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore
presented their Framework for Global Electronic Commerce. 95 Their
framework laid out the Administration's principles for e-commerce
regulation stressing that the private sector should lead and
governments should avoid undue restrictions. The United States
business community interpreted the announcement as a clear
government pledge to stay out of e-commerce regulation, as long as the
private sector could address regulators' concerns. 96 The industry did,
for the most part, deal with regulators' concerns and the government
selectively stepped in where necessary after careful evaluation. 97 Self90.
See Lobel, New Governance, supra note 80, at 71 (explaining when the government
uses New Governance models "in place of extensive elaboration of prohibitive standards and high
rates of inspection, [it] facilitates self-regulation and programs of collaborative, semi-voluntary
compliance").
Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional
91.
Perspective, 19 L. & POL'Y 363, 364-65 (1997).
92.
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation of Electronic Commerce,
51 EMORY L.J. 1, 66 (2002).
PACO UNDERHILL, WHY WE BUY: THE SCIENCE OF SHOPPING-UPDATED AND REVISED
93.
FOR THE INTERNET, THE GLOBAL CONSUMER, AND BEYOND 227-53 (2009).

94.
INTERNET

Denis Henry, Electronic Commerce: Is Industry Self-Regulation a Viable Model?,
L.

&

POL'Y

F.,

http://www.ilpf.org/events/jurisdiction2/presentations/henrypr/

[https://perma.cc/KE5A-CH9T] (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).
95.

See WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC

COMMERCE (1997), https://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/ [https://perma.cc/JS8S-CQ9K].
96.
DAVID BACH, THE NEW ECONOMY: TRANSATLANTIC POLICY COMPARISON: INDUSTRY
SELF-REGULATION
IN
THE
E-CONOMY
4
(2001),

http://www.brie.berkeley.edulpublications/GMFDB.pdf
Id. at 5.
97.

[https://perma.cc/PDR3-KZ69].

In the U.S., government's principal role is to act as latent rule-maker of last resort.
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regulation was a viable means of regulating the e-commerce because of
the Internet's a-territorial nature, issues of technical expertise and
access, and the decentralized structure of Internet activities. 98
While the state remains a significant player in New Governance,
it is an "orchestrator rather than a top-down commander." 99 New
Governance theory privileges self-regulation because it allows relevant
standard-setting bodies to develop and monitor various performance
standards. However, this self-regulation is not left unchecked; it is
audited. Appropriate public or private bodies must be equipped with
the knowledge and tools to evaluate whether performance standards
have been met. Thus, even if regulators do not have the insider
expertise to single handedly develop standards, they must possess or
outsource the technical know-how to ensure that that standard-setting
bodies have handled their "charge in an effective and reliable
manner."10 0
B. Lex Informatica and Its Potential
First defined by Joel Reidenberg, lex informatica uses
technological architectures to regulate the flow of information and
require or prohibit certain actions on technology platforms. 101 Larry
Lessig and Reidenberg both developed ideas about how technical
standards are within the control of the designer. This control confers
It thereby provides the business community with incentives to get the job done,
and to get it done right. The government does not generally delegate regulatory
authority formally to the private sector . ... Instead, it simply refrains from formal
regulation and signals its willingness to let the private sector demonstrate that

government intervention is not necessary. Yet a lack of specific legislation does
not necessarily imply a regulatory void. Common law provides entrepreneurial

judges a considerable amount of leeway. Constant fear of costly litigation is
therefore an additional mechanism that keeps self-regulating businesses in check.
Similarly, lack of formal delegation does not mean that business-developed
market rules do not have bite, that they do not obtain legal standing. Firms that
violate self-stated business terms to the detriment of consumers, for example, can
be held liable by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under broad statutes
banning deceptive business practice.
Id.
98.

JEANNE PIA MIFSUD BONNICI, SELF-REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE 202 (Aernout H.J.

Schmidt & Philip E. van Tongeren eds., 2008).
99.
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation
Through Transmittal New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 521 (2009) (describing how the New Governance model applies to international
regulation).
100.
See Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28
N. KY. L. REV. 822, 842 (2001) (describing how the FCC adopted in its approval of the AOL/Time
Warner merger a form of audited self regulation).
101.
Joel Reidenberg, Governing Networks in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 929-30
(1996) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Governing Networks] (using "lex informatica" to describe
governance through the interaction of state rules and technological choices).
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upon the designer the power to govern that system's behavior. 102 Once
constraints on behavior are built into the technical standards governing
a technology, the technical standards effectively become the way in
which we govern the use of that technology. 103 The effect of technical
standards on behavior is similar to that of law and can, at times, go
further, particularly when the user has no choice but to follow the rules
imposed by technology. 104 Lex informaticais ideal for regulations built
on performance standards and other New Governance principles for
several reasons: 1) it can prohibit undesirable activities through system
design choices; 2) it can influence participant self-monitoring behavior
through feedback loops; 3) it allows for iterative learning, which can
help parties more quickly achieve regulatory goals; and 4) it makes
auditing of platform activity more feasible.
System design choices can be a first line of defense for
preventing undesirable behavior on platform-mediated networks. In
the absence of hacking or other improper forms of manipulation,
platforms can protect participants' private data by restricting access to
information. For example, a user could be "locked out" of accessing
particular data about other users on a system like cell phone numbers
or home addresses. Platforms can also design sequences that ensure
prompt payment and prevent fraud by requiring funds to be digitally
held by the platform until both parties perform their various promises.
Platforms can also easily modify their user interfaces to ensure that
appropriate taxes are collected in a transaction.
Lex informatica can effectively implement New Governance
models by providing near perfect information about activity on
platform-mediated networks. This information is provided in part by
dynamic feedback loops based on metrics and participant reviews.1 0 5
For instance, e-commerce companies use lex informaticato self-regulate
and address the traditional market failure that leads to fraud:
asymmetrical information. They do so by using a complex series of
algorithms, mechanisms, and finely calibrated rewards and
punishments to regulate participant behavior.
102.

LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999); Joel Reidenberg,

Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 553, 556 (1998) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Lex Informatica].
Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management
103.
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 50 (2001).
BONNICI, supra note 98, at 202.
104.
John C. Moorhouse, Consumer ProtectionRegulation and Informationon the Internet,
105.
in THE HALF-LIFE OF POLICY RATIONALES: How NEW TECHNOLOGY AFFECTS OLD POLICY ISSUES

139-40 (Fred E. Foldvary & Daniel B. Klein eds., 2003) ("[T]o the extent that consumer protection
regulation is based on the claim that consumers lack adequate information, the case for
government intervention is weakened by the Internet's powerful and unprecedented ability to
provide timely and pointed consumer information.").
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eBay is a successful online platform where individuals create
accounts to enable the buying and selling of items through set prices or
an online auction process. eBay creator, Pierre Omidyar, recognized
the vast potential of the Internet and the absence of a virtual
secondhand market. In the beginning, however, eBay was in legal hot
water as state legislatures tried to classify eBay as an "auction house"
and regulate it as such (mostly with licenses and fees).10 6 Similar to
traditional businesses who compete with the sharing economy,
traditional auction houses thought eBay was at an unfair advantage
because it did not have to play by the same rules. Furthermore,
regulators had good reasons to believe that regulation was necessary.
In 2000, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) received more than
25,000 complaints for web-based auction fraud, an increase from fewer
than 1,000 complaints in 1997.107

Mr. Omidyar and his team knew that fraud had to be prevented
and that trust had to be systematically "built in" to the site. Therefore,
they created a mechanism for community members to trust the system
via the communication of peer-reviews from both buyers and sellers.10 8
In so doing, eBay created a new system that regulated participant
behavior. This system served as a trust proxy because people could rely
on a crowd-sourced, centralized system of feedback to protect their
interests.10 9
With accurate feedback systems, there is less of a need to
perform the gatekeeping functions required under a Regulation 1.0
scheme.
Instead, regulators and platforms can use feedback to
encourage participants to self-monitor (i.e., "you better be good because
you will be reviewed") and appropriately punish bad behavior if it does
occur. This approach controls and manages behavior with technology
instead of using Regulation 1.0's licensing, disclosure, and inspection
techniques.

106.
Katie Hafner, How eBay Makes Regulations Disappear, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/04/business/yourmoney/04ebay.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
[https://perma.cc/FQA8-QBTK].
107.
Internet Fraud, HearingBefore the H. Energy & Commerce Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade, & Consumer Prot., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Eileen Harrington, Assoc. Dir. of the
Div. of Mktg. Practices in the Fed. Trade Comm'n's Bureau of Consumer Prot.),
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2001/05/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commissioninternet-fraud [https://perma.cc/C8ZQ-DWSG]; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Internet Auction Fraud Targeted by Law Enforcement (Apr. 30, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2003/04/internet-auction-fraud-targeted-law-enforcers
[https://perma.cc/CSX4-24VX] (explaining how in 2002, the US National Fraud Information Center
reported that the number of complaints involving online auction transactions doubled).
108.
Anjanette Raymond & Abbey Stemler, Trusting Strangers:Dispute Resolution in the
Crowd, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RES. (forthcoming).
109.
Id.
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By embracing technologies that monitor, report, and regulate,
regulators and platforms also have the ability to identify violations that
would likely remain undiscovered, which can lead to better and more
informed decision-making through iterative learning. 110 For example,
the Environmental Protection Agency developed a Next Generation
enforcement
that embraces "innovative
program
Compliance
strategies," which encourage "evidence-based experimentation to find
out which strategies work to improve compliance and which do not."n
Using technology to uncover meaningful relationships about cause and
effect will help systems learn and become better able to prevent harm.
If, for example, eBay discovers that buyers who quickly deactivate their
accounts after large purchases do not pay, eBay can prevent
deactivation and send up a warning flag to sellers to stop shipment.
Feedback loops and detailed monitoring also improve the ability
of regulators to audit the self-regulatory techniques of platforms. As
suggested by Robert Glicksman and David Markell, "[to] the extent that
new monitoring and reporting technology is more reliable, less capable
of being manipulated, and more easily replicated because of reductions
in cost, greater mobility and other factors, it may operate to increase
If
the accuracy, reliability, and credibility of self-reporting." 112
that
metrics
regulators and stakeholders can agree to particular
correspond with performance standards, based on the widespread
collection of data by platforms, regulators can easily evaluate
performance and avoid negative slippage.
C. The Marriageof New Governance and Lex Informatica
Regulation 2.0 draws upon the comparative strengths of both
private and public stakeholders and utilizes technology to enforce
performance standards. PayPal, an online payment system company
that has struggled with regulators for years, provides an excellent
example of how Regulation 2.0 could work. 113

Robert L. Glicksman & David L. Markell, Dynamic Governance in Theory and
110.
Application, PartI (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 791; George Wash.
Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 2016-15; George Wash. Univ. Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 2016-15, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2734304 [https://perma.cc/H2GLFXB5] (arguing "[niew technologies that facilitate monitoring of or reporting on the effects of
regulated activities may facilitate regulators' ability to turn a dynamic regulatory environment to
their advantage by providing access to previously unavailable information relevant to
compliance").
26
(2013),
GENERATION
COMPLIANCE
111.
CYNTHIA
GILES,
NEXT
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-09/documents/giles-next-gen-article-forum-elisept-oct-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/EVD8-9YKX].
112.
Glicksman & Markell, supra note 110.
113.
See generally PAYPAL & EBAY INC, supra note 83.
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There are several regulatory requirements that apply to
electronic payments from the Bank Secrecy Act,1 14 which requires the
collection of identity information to combat money laundering, to
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."1 15 PayPal has
made it a priority to simplify and improve the regulation of payment
systems. It has proposed a model, with three basic components, of
"smart" regulation that utilizes "dynamic" performance standards.1 1 6
1. Iteration: PayPal argues that the command-and-control
model of regulation is untenable. Instead, it advocates for
trial-and-error techniques and tools that release favorable
system behaviors.
These techniques and tools should
embrace big data, which are high volume, high velocity, and
high variety
information assets that require new
forms of processing to enable enhanced decision-making,
insight
discovery,
and
process
optimization.1 17
2. Data Analytics:
Technology and big data underpin
PayPal's performance standards. Data analytics is used to
measure and analyze performance standards, which create a
system where the regulated entities are subject to real-time
measurements and algorithms that adapt to better achieve
regulatory goals.11 8
3.

Collaboration:
Performance
standards
require
"intervention agents," which include computer algorithms,
crowds, and recognized experts.
These agents can help
overcome regulators' lack of technical knowledge, a problem
that plagued traditional performance standards. 119

PayPal applied its dynamic performance standards to "know
your customer" regulations aimed at tackling money laundering and
terrorist financing. Generally, these laws require two things: (1) obtain
basic identification data and (2) verify the reliability and accuracy of
the data provided. PayPal argued that collecting basic information does
not achieve the regulatory objectives of avoiding money laundering and
114.
31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330 (2012).
115.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
116.
PAYPAL & EBAY INC, supra note 83, at 16 (where PayPal calls these standards
"dynamic performance standards").
117.
Id. at 21.
118.
Id. at 17.
119.
Id. at 22.
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terrorist financing. 120 Instead, PayPal proposed a regulation that would
determine a performance data point that all of today's payment service
providers could produce that is closely tied to the goals of protecting
consumers and reducing financial crime. 121
The approach to regulation that PayPal wants to take is more
akin to how modern businesses approach problems: "[T]hey are focused
on performance rather than design; they are constantly searching for
new data points and improved algorithms that better address risk,
confirm identity, reduce fraud, and protect consumers." 122 PayPal's
performance standards exemplify Regulation 2.0, as it allows for
industry to influence performance standards and it utilizes lex
informatica, via algorithms and real-time measurements, to selfregulate.
Government has been making the shift to New Governance
principals for decades, but by embracing the use of technological
architectures, big data, and common sense, Regulation 2.0 can help
society better achieve the goals of regulation. Particularly in the case
of platform-mediated technologies that disrupt traditional industries
and challenge the ways companies provide human needs, such as
transportation, hospitality, and food.
IV. REGULATION 2.0 AND THE SHARING ECONOMY
Sharing economy companies use technology to connect people
who have private excess capacity to those who want to purchase it.
Rather than calling a cab, a passenger can digitally hail a driver with
an empty back seat via Uber; rather than hiring a moving company,
customers can get help moving via TaskRabbit; rather than going to a
restaurant, customers can have a meal prepared for them in someone's
home via Eatwith.
TIME Magazine listed the sharing economy as one of the ten
ideas that will change the world, 123 and Forbes estimates that the
revenue flowing through the sharing economy surpassed $3.5 billion in
2014 and will grow twenty-five percent per year. 124 At that rate, peerto-peer sharing has moved beyond a fringe movement and into a

120.
Id. at 24-25.
121.
Id.
122.
Id. at 26.
123.
Bryan Walsh, Today's Smart Choice: Don't Own. Share, TIME, Mar. 17, 2011,
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2059521_2059717_2059710,00.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/4DFU-RUTA].
124.
Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the UnstoppableRise of the SharingEconomy, FORBES (Jan.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the7:00
AM),
23,
2013,
unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/#5b40d54d6790/ [https://perma.cc/M3XW-HDAX].

2016]

REGULATION 2.0

111

disruptive economic force. Look only to Airbnb, which at six years old
has a valuation of $13 billion, 125 much higher than the Hyatt hotel chain
($10 billion), 126 or Uber, which at four years old has a valuation of $40
billion, greater than Hertz, 127 Avis, 12 8 and Enterprise1 29 combined. 130
Currently, cities and towns across the United States are taking
one of three general approaches to regulating the sharing economy. 131
The first approach involves banning platforms outright.
Cities
throughout the United States have frequently used bans for ridesharing platforms, such as Uber and Lyft, and house sharing platforms,
such as Airbnb. 132 The second approach involves authorities imposing
regulatory structures designed for non-sharing economy businesses.
These structures are often ill-fitted for the specifics of the sharing
economy and, as a result, regulators enforce those regulations
sporadically-turning a blind eye in some instances and enforcing rules
125.
Ankit Ajmera, Airbnb Valued at $13 Billion as It Discusses Employee Stock Sale:
WSJ, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2014, 9:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-airbnb-financingidUSKCNOIDO3420141024 [https://perma.cc/47GZ-T56T].
126.
Hyatt
Hotels
Current
http://www.macroaxis.com/invest/ratio/H--Current-Valuation

Valuation,
MACROAXIS,
[https://perma.cc/DV4J-EXRS] (last

visited Nov. 24, 2014).
127.
Hertz
Global
Holdings,
YAHOO!
FINANCE,
https://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s=HTZ+Key+Statistics [https://perma.cc/7T35-T48J] (last visited
May 25, 2015).
128.

Avis

Budget

Group

Inc.,

YAHOO!

FINANCE,

https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CAR/?p=CAR [https://perma.cc/XP3W-NV2S] (last visited May 25,
2015).
129.

Mark Clothier, Billionaire'sSon Eases Grip to Take Enterprise Global, BLOOMBERG

MKTS. (Mar. 12, 2013, 3:27 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-12/billionaires-son-eases-grip-to-take-enterprise-global
[https://perma.cc/7V5A-2R74];
America's Largest
Private Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/enterprise-holdings/ (last visited
May 20, 2015).
130.

Note these valuations have been hotly contested. See Neil Irwin, Can Uber Live up to

Its
$40
Billion
Valuation?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
13,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/upshot/ubers-real-challenge-leveraging-the-networkeffect.html?_r=1&abt=0002&abg=0 [https://perma.cc/4NF2-XTB6]; Sarah Cannon & Lawrence H.
Summers, How Uber and the Sharing Economy Can Win over Regulators, HARv. BUS. REV. (Oct.
13,
2014), https://hbr.org/2014/10/how-uber-and-the-sharing-economy-can-win-over-regulators

[https://perma.cc/9YHL-KF531; Maxwell Wessel, Making Sense of Uber's $40 Billion Valuation,
HARV. Bus. REV. (Dec. 10, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/12/making-sense-of-ubers-40-billionvaluation [https://perma.cc/HHL3-F859].
131.
See Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Sharing Economy, 43
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 33 (forthcoming 2016).
132.
Laurie Kulikowski, Uber Banned in 5 U.S. Cities That Want Your Taxi Business,
MAINSTREET (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.mainstreet.com/article/uber-banned-in-5-us-cities-thatwant-your-taxi-business [https://perma.cc/3ELZ-PWKM] (citing, for example, Little Rock, AK, Las
Vegas, NV, Portland, OR, Richmond, VA, Cambridge, MA, have banned Uber); Michael DeMocker,
New Orleans Confronts Unlicensed Short Term Rentals: To Legalize or Keep Ban?, TIMES
PICAYUNE (June 3, 2014, 8:29 PM), http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2014/06/new-orleans
[https://perma.cc/QA2R-XG3S] (explaining that in New Orleans and many other cities, it is illegal
to provide unlicensed short-term rentals).
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in others. 133 Some areas, however, utilize a third approach: working
with platforms to reach common ground. For example, the California
Public Utility Commission worked with several ride-sharing companies
to develop new regulations for the industry. 134
There are significant problems with each approach. The first
approach-the outright ban of the platforms-cuts off the potential
economic and environmental benefits of the sharing economy. The
second-imposing ill-fitting regulations or turning a blind eye-is not
sustainable, puts consumers at risk, and gives supply-side users 135 an
unfair advantage over traditional industries. As Airbnb founder
Nathan Blecharczyk, states: "We're not advocating that there shouldn't
be rules. We're just saying that things have evolved and it's worth
The third-novel
taking a fresh look from the ground up."13 6
approach-is often reactionary and piecemeal, because these new
regulations are not grounded in a clear conceptual understanding of
what the sharing economy is.
The sharing economy must be viewed as a new form of market,
driven by technology. 137 This new market does not rely on traditional
capitalistic assumptions about entrepreneurship and wealth creation,
which involve entrepreneurs organizing firms, exploiting privately held
information, and leveraging business and personal assets to develop
new products or services. 138 By contrast, the sharing economy allows
supply-side users to make the most out of their existing assets by
outsourcing key business functions to intermediaries.1 39
Regulators must properly conceptualize the sharing economy as
something new and different and understand why it should be
133.
See, e.g., Ron Lieber, A $2,400 Fine for an Airbnb Host, N.Y. TIMES: BUCKS (May 21,
2013, 2:22 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/a-2400-fine-for-an-airbnb-host/?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/26C5-7YXCI.
Press Release, California Public Utility Commission, CPUC Establishes Rules for
134.
2013),
19,
(Sept.
Companies
Network
Transportation
http://does.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDoes/Published/G000/MO77/Kl32/77132276.PDF
(in California, ride-sharing companies are now called
[https://perma.cc/WE82-6WVA]
"transportation network companies," and they must comply with twenty-eight insurance and
safety requirements in order to operate).
"Supply-side users" refers to the individuals selling their excess capacity as opposed
135.
to the consumers who purchase that excess capacity. This Article argues that these supply-side
users should be considered "microbusinesses" rather than employees of sharing economy
platforms.
136.
Regulate
This!,
FREAKONOMICS
(Sept.
4,
2014),
http://freakonomics.com/2014/09/04/regulate-this-a-new-freakonomics-radio-podcast/
[https://perma.cc/TUN2-PFRV].
See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an
137.
Alternative Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241 (2015).
138.

(1982).
139.

See MARK CASSON, THE ENTREPRENEUR: AN ECONOMIC THEORY 20, 39 (2d ed. 2003)

See Dyal-Chand, supra note 137, at 258.
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encouraged. Otherwise, regulators will continue to adopt inconsistent
and ineffective regulations or conclude that such sharing practices
amount to unfair play and should be stopped.
With a clear
understanding of the uniqueness of the sharing economy, Regulation
2.0 can be utilized and regulatory goals can be achieved. Furthermore,
if regulatory goals are achieved, cries of unfair competition among
competitors of the sharing economy will be without merit.
A. Disruptive Sharing
Humans have always shared, but new sharing markets enabled
by technology and the free flow of information present a new form of
market that is difficult to conceptualize. 14 0 The sharing economy is a
disruptive force that allows for the sharing of underutilized assets, from
spaces to skills to things, for monetary gain on a scale that would not
be achievable without modern technology. 141 This system facilitates
localized
production,
cooperation,
and the
proliferation
of
microbusinesses, 142 which allows consumer needs to be met by a large
cross-section of society. 143 This ease of access is made possible by
platform companies, which broker the transactions. 14 4
B. Notable Sectors of the SharingEconomy
Sharing economy platforms are not limited to industry-specific
sectors because they can, in theory, act as a broker between consumers
and suppliers for any consumer-owned product or service. The sharing
economy has, however, affected three industries in particular (1)
transportation, (2) accommodation, and (3) services.

140.
Id.
141.
Botsman, supra note 2. Note that Botsman includes nonmonetary gain in her
definition of the sharing economy. This Article does not.
142.
Cal. Ass'n for Micro Enter. Opportunity, What is Micro Enterprise?, MICROBIZ.ORG,
http://www.microbiz.org/about-micro-business/what-is-micro-enterprise/
[https://perma.cc/4ZP6TG5H] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). As discussed in greater detail in the sections below, many
people are involved in the sharing economy at a micro level, offering whatever excess capacity they
personally have. They operate as microbusinesses, which are the very smallest of businesses with
little overhead and capital. The owners of microbusinesses act as managers and are responsible
for all aspects of the business not outsourced to platforms. Because margins are so thin for these
microbusinesses and resources are limited, they must not be overly burdened with regulations.
143.
Benita Matofska, What Is the SharingEconomy?, PEOPLE WHO SHARE (Sept. 1, 2016),
http://www.thepeoplewhoshare.com/blog/what-is-the-sharing-economy
[https://perma.cc/F74MMXAG].
144.
This Article does not include peer-to-peer goods-marketplaces, such as eBay, in its
definition of the sharing economy because those sites generally do not deal in the sale or rental of
personal excess capacity.

114

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. XIX:1:87

Transportation. Car sharing schemes can be divided into peerto-peer car-rental services in which you pay to borrow someone else's
car (Buzzcar, Getaround, RelayRide) and taxi-like services (Uber, Lyft,
SideCar) in which people use their cars to ferry paying passengers. Car
sharing schemes compete with traditional car rental companies and
taxi-like companies, unsurprisingly, compete with the taxi industry
because they allow consumers to digitally hail cars. 145
Accommodation. Several platforms allow travelers to rent spare
bedrooms and entire homes, instead of staying at hotels and bed and
breakfasts. The most high-profile platform in this space is Airbnb;
however, others such as Vacation Rentals By Owner (VRBO) work on a
similar basis. As of Spring 2015, over 25 million people have used
Airbnb to rent over a million homes as an alternative to traditional
accommodations. 14 6 At this scale, the sharing economy poses a
significant threat to the hotel industry and a real challenge for
policymakers regarding safety, zoning, and tax issues.
Services. People are using sharing economy platforms to sell
personal services directly to consumers. Homejoy and Handy are
marketplaces for housecleaning and "handyman" work, while
TaskRabbit and Mechanical Turk let people outsource a wide variety of
tasks and services, ranging from simple errands and chores to website
design. These services have seen much less attention in the regulatory
debates surrounding the sharing economy, likely because these
companies have been much less successful than Airbnb or Uber. 147 If a
great services platform with excellent leadership were to form, it is
likely that this sector would draw more criticism.
While the descriptions above might suggest that the sharing
economy is a diverse set of commercial and non-commercial initiatives,
in reality Airbnb, Uber, Lyft, Prosper, and Lending Club are the rare,
unicorn companies, that make up the sharing economy. 148 These
technology firms are backed by large amounts of venture capital.
Regulators must be aware of the oligopolistic nature of the sharing
economy, especially when crafting and enforcing regulations within it.

145. Defendant Uber Techs., Inc.'s Notice of Removal, McCandliss v. Uber Techs., Inc., No.
1:14-cv-03275, 2014 WL 5154296 (N.D. Ga., Oct. 10, 2014) (No. 1-3). Taxi and limousine drivers in
Georgia accuse Uber of failing to comply with Atlanta's safety policies and regulations and
"operating a de facto taxicab business" without the required licenses. See id.
About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [https://perma.cc/9UGH146.
ALHN] (last visited May 20, 2015).
147.
Joshua Brustein, Trouble at TaskRabbit Is Bad News for the Sharing Economy,
BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-07-09/trouble-attaskrabbit-is-bad-news-for-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/U8LP-V65T].
148.
A unicorn means a company valued at over a billion dollars.

2016]

REGULATION 2.0

115

C. A New Market
For the sharing economy to be properly understood and
regulated, a clear and defensible theoretical perspective on the sharing
economy must be developed. 149 Northeastern University's Rashmi
Dyal-Chand draws on Yochai Benkler's research on not-for-profit
sharing (think, car pools and distributed computing) to set a theoretical
backdrop for regulating the sharing economy. 15 0 Benkler was the first
to compare the not-for-profit sharing economy to the "mainstream of
economic theory," 5 1 as represented by an integration of Ronald Coase's
theory of the firml 52 and Harold Demsetz's explanation of property
rights. 153
Dyal-Chand explains that Benkler asserts that in mainstream
markets, individuals organize themselves into firms to lower the costs
of doing business, and they invest in private ownership of property to
most efficiently achieve economic gain.15 4 As Coase and Demsetz argue,
the costs of doing business in this manner are lower than the costs of,
for example, contracting out tasks to specialists in the market. 155 By
contrast, in the not-for-profit sharing economy, individuals organize
access to and use of some of their assets in a manner similar to a
commons arrangement, rather than appropriating and guarding
information and other assets for each firm's or individual's private
use.15 6 This arrangement is a "puzzle" to Benkler and he solves it by
arguing that the not-for-profit sharing economy is an alternative to
mainstream markets.1 57

&

149.
Dyal-Chand, supra note 137, at 271.
150.
See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm,
112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Coase's Penguin];Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely:
On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114
YALE L.J. 273 (2004) [hereinafter Benkler, SharingNicely].
151.
Benkler, Coase's Penguin, supra note 150, at 401.
152.
See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). Coase
argued that people organize themselves into firms to avoid the transaction costs of using the
market: for example, search and information costs, bargaining costs, keeping trade secrets, and
policing and enforcement costs. See id.
153.
See generally Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON.
ORG. 141 (1988). Demsetz explains why property rights emerge with a simple rationale: property
rights systems emerge if the social costs of property rights in a specific resource are lower than the
costs of such a system. See id.
154.
Dyal-Chand, supra note 137, at 267.
Id.
155.
156.
Benkler, Coase's Penguin, supra note 150, at 423-43.
157.
Dyal-Chand, supra note 137, at 267-68. In two articles, Benkler traces the
development of commons-based peer production as a legitimate alternative form of economic
production. Id.; Benkler, SharingNicely, supra note 150. In all of his examples, such as open source
software, Benkler does not focus on sharing for a profit, but rather he draws a sharp distinction
between "social sharing" and "markets," even secondary markets such as eBay. Benkler, Sharing
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Dyal-Chand expands Benkler's work and applies it to for-profit
sharing arguing that for-profit sharing is also outside of mainstream
understandings of markets in that platforms enable the sharing of
information and key business operations. 15 8 Stated simply, supply-side
users provide both information about and access to assets and services
in order to make a profit. In contrast, platforms distill information and
create systems to facilitate transactions, also for a profit. It is the
sharing of these two sets of resources outside of a firm structure that
makes the for-profit sharing economy unique. 159
After discussing how assets and information are shared in the
sharing economy, Dyal-Chand argues that this structure is similar to a
coordinated market economy, which is something frequently seen in
countries such as Germany. 160 Coordinated markets operate on
"strategic interaction,"161 a mode of interaction in which businesses
engage in relatively more informal contracting and sharing of what
might be described in the United States as private or "insider"
information, often about sources of financing, technology, and business
governance. 162 Traditional markets are marked by competitive, armslength market transactions that make use of information that is
privately acquired and used by individual businesses. 163 Coordinated
market economies, by contrast, involve the coordination among
businesses, which is made possible by institutional intermediaries such
as trade associations and unions. 164
Dyal-Chand's comparison of the sharing economy to coordinated
markets, while forced in parts, 165 is extremely helpful in that it further

Nicely, supra note 150, at 306-21. As a consequence, Benkler's main inquiries focus only on how
such a form of not-for-profit sharing could function as a stable mode of economic production. Id. at
320-56.
Dyal-Chand, supra note 137, at 268.
158.
Id. at 269.
159.
PETER HALL & DAVID SOSKICE, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL
160.
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 9 (2001). A coordinated market economy is a form of

capitalism described in the varieties of capitalism theory first proposed by Peter Hall and David
Soskice. See id.
Id.
161.
See id. Coordinated market economies are a type of capitalism identified by Peter
162.
Hall and David Soskice in their theory on varieties of capitalism. See id. Coordinated markets are
distinguished from liberal market economies. Id.
163.
Id.
Id. Institutional intermediaries accomplish three general functions: (1) they enable
164.
the sharing of critical business resources (e.g., information on demand, technology, and
standardized contracts), (2) they monitor participant behavior, and (3) they sanction participants
for misbehavior. Id. In the sharing economy, platforms perform these same functions.
There are some characteristics of coordinated market economies that do not directly
165.
align with the sharing economy. For example, in coordinated markets, often democratically
controlled groups like unions and trade associations are the intermediaries. In the case of the
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identifies a distinct feature of sharing markets, namely platforms.
Combined with Benkler's idea of outsourcing key business functions
and the horizontal distribution of assets, we can begin to see how the
sharing economy involves market behavior that is distinct. The
subsections below discuss the role of platforms and identify other
characteristics of the sharing economy that distinguish it from
traditional markets.
1. Platforms
Platforms in the sharing economy enable commercial
transactions by linking sellers of products or services with buyers of
those products or services. These platforms are peer-to-peer in that
they are decentralized on both sides of the platform, in contrast to
single-sided platforms, which follow Coasian norms and offer their own
products or services to potential buyers (for example, Amazon.com). 166
The intermediary for the Airbnb network runs the website.1 6 7 The
intermediaries for car services such as Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar create
and manage mobile phone applications to connect drivers to
passengers.1 68
Like the trade associations and unions in a coordinated market
economy, platforms greatly reduce the transaction costs of doing
business. 169 They standardize the terms of trade, provide a wealth of
information about the markets via sophisticated websites and facilitate
payments. For example, in the Airbnb network, individual hosts have
outsourced to Airbnb the tasks of determining market demand,
advertising, maintaining a stable supply of customers, and facilitating
payments. 170 Without the platform, supply-side users would have to
perform each of these tasks on their own. 171 For many people involved
in these networks, the costs of performing such tasks on their own
sharing economy, there are just single corporate entities dictating the terms of the interactions
between participants.
166.
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The "Sharing" Economy: Issues Facing Platforms,
Participants,
and Regulators:
A
Federal
Trade
Commission
Workshop
(2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/press-releases/fte-examine-competitionconsumer-

protection-economic-issues-raised-sharing-economy-june-workshop/l50416economyworkshop.pdf
[https://perma.cclWU97-A6LY].
167.
About Us, supra note 146.
168.
The Uber App, UBER, https://www.uber.com/about [https://perma.cc/2MWX-JTUH]
(last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
169.
Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Policy: The
Future of Local Regulation of the "Shared Economy" (N.Y. Univ. Marion Inst. of Urban Mgmt.,
Working Paper No. 21, 2015).
170.
How
to
Host,
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.gy/wishlists/airbnb-picks
[https://perma.cc/2SZ3-4VUL] (last visited June 10, 2015).
171.
Geron, supra note 124.
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would be unacceptably cost-prohibitive. 172 Platforms also monitor and
sanction participant behavior. For example, Airbnb and Uber use
technology and feedback systems to monitor and kick off users that pose
a threat to consumer well being or satisfaction.
2. Microbusinesses
Viewing platforms as coordinating intermediaries rather than
Coasian firms also enables regulators to look at supply-side users of the
sharing economy as microbusinesses with their personal assets rather
than employees.1 7 3 This distinction helps focus on new approaches to
regulating platforms-as opposed to treating them as traditional firms
with armies of employees. All of the platforms view supply-side users
as independent contractors in an attempt to reduce burdens related to
labor and employment laws, such as unemployment insurance, workers'
compensation, or tax responsibilities and to absolve themselves of all
liability for harm caused by peer-to-peer interactions. 1 7 4 However,
because various tests for distinguishing employees from independent
contractors are often factors tests, it is sometimes unclear exactly where
supply-side users fall. Platforms attempt to make all supply-side users
independent contractors via contracts and division of responsibility.
Pursuant to the common law "right-to-control" test, an agent is
an employee, as opposed to an independent contractor, if the principal
has the right to control the physical details of the work performed by
the agent.1 75 This means that the principal not only directs the end
result, but also controls how the employee completes the work. 176
Applying this test to Airbnb, it is easy to argue that hosts control. The
platform leaves to the hosts decisions about how to list and advertise
his or her properties, how much to charge for rental, whom to choose as
renters, the terms of rental, and even the method of payment.1 77 If the
result of the contracting relationship between the platform and the
hosts is to rent properties for short terms, Airbnb plainly treats hosts
as independent contractors who control the means and manner of the
work.
Id.
172.
Dyal-Chand, supra note 137, at 241.
173.
See Stemler, supra note 131.
174.
Viado v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 217 P.3d 199, 202 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). Several factors
175.
are used to determine the extent of the right to control, such as: (1) the independent nature of the
person's business, (2) the person's obligation to furnish necessary tools, supplies, and material to
perform the job, (3) the right to control progress of the work, except as to final results, (4) the time
for which the person is employed, and (5) the method of payment, whether by time or by the job. See
id.; see also Poynor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 441 S.W.3d 315, 319 (Tex. App. 2013).
176.
Viado, 217 P.3d at 202.
How to Host, supranote 170.
177.
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The broader Restatement (Second) of Agency test used by some
courts to define the line between employees and independent
contractors leads to similar conclusions.17 8 Of the ten factors for
consideration, such factors as control, whether the agent is engaged in
a distinct occupation or business (the platform is a technology company
the other is akin to an innkeeper), the place of work, the length of time
agent is employed, the method of payment (by task instead of by time),
and belief of the parties all suggest an independent contractor
relationship.17 9

For taxi-like services such as Uber the analysis is much less
clear. 18 0 Uber remains steadfast in its claim that drivers hold
independent contractor status. On the sign-up page for potential
drivers to join Uber, the wording is unmistakable: "Drive with Uber and
earn great money as an independent contractor. Get paid weekly just
for helping our community of riders get rides around town. Be your own
boss and get paid in fares for driving on your own schedule."18 1
Uber spokesman Taylor Bennett further clarified Uber's position
on driver classification when he stated: "They're independent
contractors. We don't hire drivers. We're a technology company. We
provide the app that they use, that connects passengers with drivers.
They have the flexibility of being their own boss." 18 2 Uber drivers are
indeed entirely flexible as to when they choose to work so long as they
give at least one ride every 180 days or every thirty days, depending on
the program they sign up for. 183 In addition, they never have to accept
any leads generated by Uber, and they can completely control how they

178. The Restatement (Second) of Agency uses ten factors for determining whether an agent
is an independent contractor or an employee: (1) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the

master may exercise over the details of the work; (2) whether or not the one employed is engaged
in a distinct occupation or business; (3) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision; (4) the skill required in the particular occupation; (5) whether the employer or the
workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(6) the length of time for which the person is employed; (7) the method of payment, whether by the
time or by the job; (8) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(9) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and
(10) whether the principal is or is not in business. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 220

(Am.

Law Inst. 1958).
179.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989).
180.
See Robert Sprague, Worker (Mis)Classificationin the SharingEconomy: Square Pegs
Trying to Fit in Round Holes, 31 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 53 (2015).
181.
Drive, UBER, https://get.uber.com/drive/ [https://perma.cc/Q5UA-EMVU] (last visited
June 4, 2015).
182.
Dick Hogan, Uber Ride Service Would Bring Controversy, NEWS-PRESS.COM (Sept. 10,
2014, 10:53 PM), http://www.news-press.com/story/money/2014/09/10/uber-ride-service-bringcontroversy/1542 1511/ [https://perma.cc/B6BC-3PSM].
183.
O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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get from point A to point B for the rides they do accept. 184 However,
Uber does instruct drivers on how to interact with passengers, the
prices charged, including the controversial surge pricing system, 18 5 the
terms and forms of payment, and the type and look of their vehicles. It
also has a system by which passengers can rate drivers-with a
consequence of "deactivation" for drivers whose ratings fall below a
certain level. 186 In short, Uber manages many more aspects of the
Not
means and manner of the work performed by the drivers.
surprisingly, many of the factors comprising the more fact-sensitive
agency test also point in the direction of treating Uber's drivers as
employees rather than independent contractors.18 7
Instead of classifying Uber drivers and other supply-side users
in the sharing economy as either employees or independent contractors,

184.
Id. at 1149.
https://help.uber.com/h/f0934623-5fbc-4628-8ddOUBER,
Ratings,
Improve
185.
565d5e451882 [https://perma.cc/9WQY-Y2U9] (last visited Nov. 2, 2016) (describing how to
interact with customers to receive a five star rating, including "keep conversation polite,
professional, and respectful" and "help with luggage and bags when it's safe to do so"); What is
https://help.uber.com/hl34212e8b-d69a-4d8a-a923-095d3075b487
UBER,
Pricing?,
Surge
[https://perma.cc/NF57-3PG5] (last visited Nov. 2, 2016); Annie Lowrey, Is Uber's Surge-Pricing
an
Example
of
High-Tech
Gouging?,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(Jan.
10
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/magazine/is-ubers-surge-pricing-an-example-of-high-techgouging.html [https://perma.cc/G9U7-GRCB].
186.
Understanding Ratings, UBER, https://help.uber.com/hl99928811-f3aO-4fd6-9feea3436b5238d0 [https://perma.cc/9WQY-Y2U9] (last visited Nov. 2, 2016).
187.
Two cases that could change the sharing economy landscape have recently been ruled
on by US District Court Judges in San Francisco federal court. These separate cases were brought
in class-action status against Uber and Lyft on behalf of drivers who contend that they should be
considered employees. Both companies were hoping that the courts would issue summary
judgment orders, maintaining independent contractor status for the drivers of each company.

However, both courts concluded that the law was too ambiguous for them to decide and that each
case must proceed to a jury ruling within the California legal system. Alison Griswold, Are Uber
Drivers Employees? The Trial That Could Devastate the "SharingEconomy," SLATE: MONEYBOX
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/03
12:54
PM),
12,
2015,
(Mar.
/12/uberlyft-employment-casesjuries-coulddecidethe_1egalfateof-thesharing.html
[https://perma.cc/ZUC3-XDHJ].
In addition, the California Labor Commission recently classified Uber drivers as employees.
See Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-15-546378, at *6 (Ca. Dep't Lab. June 3, 2016) (appeal
of Labor Commissioner award). The agency stated: "Defendants hold themselves out as nothing
more than a neutral technological platform, designed simply to enable drivers and passengers to
transact the business of transportation." Id. "The reality, however, is that Defendants are involved
in every aspect of the operation." Id. The labor commission noted that Uber vets prospective
drivers, maintains quality control procedures for both passengers and drivers, such as a rating
system, and that Uber had "all necessary control over the operation as a whole." Id. This case was
not the first time that Uber's drivers were classified as employees. The Florida Department of
Economic Opportunity found that a former Uber driver was eligible for unemployment
compensation. Lisa Milam-Perez, Uber Drivers Are Not Employees, Florida Unemployment Agency
Finds, WOLTERS KLUWER: EMPLOYMENT LAW DAILY.COM, http://www.employmentlawdaily.com

/index.php/news/uber-drivers-are-not-employees-florida-unemployment-agency-finds/
[https://perma.cc/PM26-BLG6] (last visited Nov. 2, 2016).

REGULATION 2.0

2016]

121

regulators could create a new classification. 188 This new classification
has been identified as "dependent contractors," or for this Article
"microbusinesses"-workers who fall between clear-cut employees and
traditional independent contractors. 189 This new classification would
enable regulators to think differently about how to fill regulatory gaps.
They might, for example, find it more useful to focus on regulating
platforms because they are dependent on the supply-side users. In
addition, if they recognize sharing networks as distinct from their
traditional Coasian counterparts, they might fashion rules that would
allow the two to coexist.
3. Excess Capacity
Another distinguishing feature of the sharing economy is its
utilization of excess capacity. 190 Manufacturers use the term "excess
capacity" to refer to an underutilized asset that is not being fully
exploited to create value, be it an idle assembly line or a factory running
only one shift when it could potentially be running two or three. 19 1 In
the sharing economy, people have excess capacity in areas such as their
things, space, and time, and it is this excess capacity that supply-side
users are monetizing for their benefit. Microbusinesses are, for the
most part, not acquiring new assets to leverage or sell.
This excess capacity feature of the sharing economy has no
natural limit. As more users of sharing economy platforms realize the
188.
Some scholars argue that using a twentieth-century test to classify workers in the
twenty-first century economy is inappropriate. Sprague, supra note 193, at 21, 23; cf. Cotter v.
Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081-82 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ("The test the California courts have
developed over the 20th Century for classifying workers isn't very helpful in addressing this 21st
Century problem.").
189.
Harry Williams Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor:A Study of the Legal Problems
of CountervailingPower, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 89, 89-117 (1965) (first to use the term "dependent
contractor"). Other countries, including Canada and Germany, already have labor laws covering
this type of employment. Lauren Weber, What if There Were a New Type of Worker? Dependent
Contractor, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if-there-were-a-new-

type-of-worker-dependent-contractor-1422405831 [https://perma.cclDQ4A-J6P7].
190.
The definition of the sharing economy should only include people utilizing their excess
capacity. Currently "superusers" exploit sharing economy platforms to effectively operate
traditional businesses. For example, a report by New York State attorney general, Eric T.
Schneiderman, found that almost half of Airbnb's $1.45 million revenue from New York City in
2010 came from hosts who had at least three listings on the site. There were only 119 of these
users, a small minority, claiming a large share of the business. These superusers should not be
considered part of the sharing economy because they are creating new capacity rather than
efficiently using excess capacity and they are unfairly competing with the non-sharing industry
economy

players.

See

ERIC

T.

SCHNEIDERMAN,

AIRBNB

IN

THE

CITY

http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XTL7-9T8F].
191.
The
Rise
of
the
Sharing
Economy,
TRIPLEPUNDIT.COM
http://www.triplepundit.com/uploads/TheRiseof-theSharingEconomy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MR8K-SC87] (last visited Nov. 2, 2016).

(2014),

1,

20,

122

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. XIX:1:87

profit potential of renting out rooms and cars, they are putting new
assets online and forming companies that resemble traditional
companies. If users are hiring employees, purchasing space and assets,
and using sharing economy platforms to sell them, they are acting more
like traditional firms and should potentially be treated as such. If
platforms want a new regulatory framework to apply to them, they
must carefully filter out traditional firms from microbusinesses. In
effect, to distinguish a site like Airbnb from an online travel agent,
participation must be limited to microbusinesses with individual excess
capacity. Limiting participant use is possible with technology, but
sharing economy companies do not have the incentive to do so.
4. High-Powered Information Exchange
Technology is essential for high-powered information exchange
in sharing economy markets. Specifically, technologies such as highspeed Internet, the Global Positioning System, open data, the ubiquity
and low-cost of mobile phones, and social media makes sharing excess
Before the advent of many of the
capacity cheap and easy. 192
technologies that connect our world, it was difficult, if not impossible,
to access information about excess capacity at the individual level.
Now, technology gives people access to crowd-sourced information in
For example, before an app was created that would
real-time.
immediately tell you everyone in your vicinity who is willing to give you
a ride the airport, you had to call a friend or your local taxi company,
schedule a pickup, and hope the driver arrived on time. Our limited
access to information was a structural constraint on the supply for a
given market. It was not that people did not have excess capacity-we
always had empty spare bedrooms and back seats-it was that there
was no way to connect the people who needed something with the people
who had it.
The characteristics of the sharing economy demonstrate how the
behaviors in the sharing economy are qualitatively different than
behavior of traditional Coasian firms. Simply stated, these features are
also what current regulations ignore. While it is possible to find many
businesses that are similar to sharing economy platforms (Craigslist,
Tupperware, FedEx, etc.), none incorporate all four dimensionsplatforms, microbusinesses, excess capacity, and technology.

Andrew Batey, Mobile + Sharing Economy + Internet of Things = the Coming
192.
Economic Boom, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/237646
[https://perma.cc/7S3L-58BX].
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D. Market Failuresin the SharingEconomy
The sharing economy offers several advantages: jobs, more
efficient and sustainable allocation of resources, lower prices, stronger
communities, and greater access to services. 193 Though the benefits of

193.
The sharing economy creates jobs by utilizing existing capacity of individuals and
their real and personal property. A resolution at the U.S. Conference of Mayors meeting in June
2013 stated that in the sharing economy, "companies have proved to be engines of innovation and
job creation, driving economic development in the hearts of American cities, where joblessness is
still most pervasive." U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, 81ST ANNUAL MEETING: IN SUPPORT OF

POLICIES
FOR
SHAREABLE
CITIES,
(2013),
http://www.usmayors.org/resolutions/81st-conference/metrol8.asp
[https://perma.cc/Y8LRRZNF]. Participating in the sharing economy also enables people to be more entrepreneurial and
pursue nontraditional forms of work. For example, in Portland, Oregon 45 percent of Airbnb hosts
are self-employed, freelancers, or part-time workers, and 12 percent of hosts have used Airbnb
income to support themselves while launching a new business. The Airbnb Community's Economic
Impact in Portland, AIRBNB, http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/airbnb-communitys-economic-impactportland/ [https://perma.cc/J8M3-G4ZK] (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
The barriers to entry in the sharing economy are also low. Sharing leverages a wide variety of
resources and makes it easier to start small businesses, with the outsourcing of tasks and
innovations like shared workspaces, shared commercial kitchens, community-financed start-ups,
community-owned commercial centers, and spaces for "pop-up" businesses. Boyd Cohen & Jan
Keitzmann, Polices for Shareable Cities: A Sharing Economy Policy Primerfor Urban Leaders,
SHAREABLE
AND
THE
SEC
(Sept.
9,
2013),
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/39811237/Policies%20for%20shareable%2OCities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26MW-VRSK]. Anyone with a car or free time can participate in the sharing
economy. The opportunities for individuals to create their own microbusinesses to supplement or
fully provide income is virtually unlimited. Id.
As for the environment, the sharing economy blends the world of profitability and
sustainability. Sara Gutterman, 'SharingEconomy'Will Save Our Economy and the Environment,
ENVTL. LEADER (July 17, 2014), http://www.environmentalleader.com/2014/07/17/sharingeconomy-will-save-our-economy-and-the-environment/#ixzz3K77vHFC1
[https://perma.cc/5NNP27SH]. It minimizes manufacturing and distribution costs and reduces the need for capitalintensive infrastructure because products are shared locally. Id.; John Boitnott, How the Sharing
Economy Is Booming Without Hurting the Environment, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 11, 2014),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/238958
[https://perma.cc/3QZ2-B5VY].
The
sharing
economy encourages people to reuse or recycle goods rather than buy new ones. For example, you
can swap an old book for a different book on a swapping site. See JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW
IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING PEOPLE BUILD COOPERATIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, AND

LOCAL SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES 423 (2012) (explaining the types of sharing practices that have
developed in the sharing economy, like barter networks or used item swaps). Furthermore, the
sharing economy discourages waste by tapping into under-utilized assets. For example, Uber
reduces the number of cars we need to have on our roads or parking lots.
An additional benefit of the sharing economy is that it offers a solution to the peak load
problems that have been plaguing cities for decades. Consider a city hosting the Super Bowl. It
could much more easily accommodate an onslaught of out-of-towners if individuals were allowed
to rent out their spare bedrooms, instead of building a new set of hotels that would oversupply the
market much of the year.
Due in large part to the free flow of information and the increase in supply, sharing economy
markets often sell products and services at lower prices than those demanded by their analogs in
the non-sharing economy. A recent survey of US adults familiar with the sharing economy found
that
86
percent
agree
it
makes
life
more
affordable.
Sharing Economy,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
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the sharing economy might justify "special treatment," this new
structure must still serve the desired ends of regulations, even if we
must pursue different means to achieve them. Several market failures
associated with the sharing economy cannot be fully addressed with
current standards. 194 They include asymmetric information, negative
externalities, and anticompetitive behavior.
1. Asymmetric Information
The first form of market failure in the sharing economy occurs
in the realm of consumer safety. The sharing economy puts consumers
in inherently vulnerable positions-getting into someone's car, inviting
someone into your home, etc. A score of high-profile incidents over the
course of the past few years have highlighted the potential threats to
consumer safety the sharing economy presents. 195 For example, in
2011, an Airbnb host came home to an aggressively ransacked
apartment, finding her cash,' credit cards, jewelry, and electronics
missing, as well as evidence that the thieves had photocopied her birth
certificate and social security number. 196 And Lyft was the subject of a
widely publicized stalking episode involving a Lyft driver and his
female passenger.1 9 7 Though sharing economy platforms certainly want
to reduce the number of these incidents, they wash their hands of
As discussed below, platforms are thus
responsibility for them.

http://www.pwc.com/enUS/us/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-seriesthe-sharing-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6TX-7DZS] (last visited June 15, 2015); see also Neil
Irwin, How Cheap Can a Car Ride Get?, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2014, at 3(L); Christopher Koopman,
Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The Sharing Economy and Consumer ProtectionRegulation:
2014),
(Dec.
*3-5
RESEARCH
MERCATUS
Change,
for
Policy
The
Case
[https://perma.cc/4CXPhttp://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Koopman-Sharing-Economy.pdf
A5FJ]. Yoachai Benkler has provided a thorough analysis of the "information collection cost"
savings of peer-to-peer networks, and it appears that when such networks operate in a market,
these savings accrue partly to the benefit of buyers in the form of lower prices. Benkler, Coase's
Penguin, supra note 150, at 407-15. Prices are also lowered because key business functions are
outsourced to platforms, thereby creating economies of scale.
Most notably, this Article does not discuss the many concerns of communities in which
194.
sharing economies operate. Most of these concerns relate to negative externalities of sharing
economy platforms, such as increase in local rents, noise, traffic congestion, etc.
195.
In the ride-sharing arena, the consumer protection website www.whosdrivingyou.com
keeps a comprehensive list of safety incidents. Complete List of Incidents Involving Uber and Lyft,
WHO'S

DRIVING

You?,

http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents.html

[https://perma.cc/84Q5-CFDK] (last visited June 25, 2015).
Michael Arrington, The Moment of Truth for Airbnb as User's Home Is Utterly
196.
Trashed, TECHCRUNCH (July 27, 2011) http://techcrunch.com/2011/07/27/the-moment-of-truth-forairbnb-as-users-home-is-utterly-trashed/ [https://perma.cc/5TJR-DQXZ].
Sam Biddle, When Your Smartphone Chauffeur Becomes A Stalker, GAWKER:
197.
VALLEYWAG (July 16, 2013, 12:17 PM), http://valleywag.gawker.com/when-your-smartphonechauffeur-becomesa-stalker-801080008/ [https://perma.cc/6CTK-YSG4].
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criticized for profiting from collaboration without accepting all of the
negative externalities. 198
The regulatory response to safety concerns has been either to
ban sharing businesses from operating or to require them to obtain the
same permits required of their competitors in the non-sharing economy
for rooms, rides, and other services. 199 Notably, in early 2014, the
Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles issued cease and desist letters
to both Uber and Lyft, ordering them to stop operating their services in
that state. 200 Bans and permits are somewhat effective ways of
protecting consumers from harm, but they have the serious potential to
devastate sharing economy markets.
Because the sharing economy often involves the exchange of
personal information, including credit card data, people interested in
committing fraud lurk throughout the sharing economy. HiGear, a carsharing service focusing on luxury vehicles, was forced to shut down in
early 2012 after a criminal ring used stolen identities and credit cards
to bypass security checks and stole four cars totaling $400,000.201 Using
a composite of photos and details collected from the web, they construct
an ideal vacation rental in a target market and then price it very
competitively. When users reach out to book the property or learn more,
the host tries to deliver links to an external site to collect booking data.
Then, after taking credit card information, the host disappears. 202 It is
198.

Juliet Schor, Debating the Sharing Economy, GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE (Oct.

2014)
http://greattransition.org/publication/debating-the-sharing-economy
[https://perma.cc/PZC3-NFUC].
199.
Lori Aratani, Competition from UberX, Lyft Has D.C. Taxis Crying Foul, WASH. POST
(May 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/competition-fromuberx-lyft-has-dc-taxis-crying-foul/2014/05/11/5920c866-d6Oa- 11e3-8a788fe50322a72cstory.html [https://perma.cclVSA3-Z4PH]; Paul Nussbaum, PUC Approves UberX
for
State,
Not
Philadelphia,
PHILA.
INQUIRER
(Nov.
14,
2014),
http://www.philly.com/philly/business/transportation/20141114_PUC-approvesUberforstate_
not Philadelphia.html [https://perma.cc/HV5U-HHND]; Andy Vuong, Likely Ride-Sharing Nod
Would Be a First, DENV. POST, Apr. 30, 2014, at A10; Uber Ordered to Stop Operating in South
Carolina,
USA
TODAY
(Jan.
16,
2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/01/15/uber-ordered-to-stop-operating-in-south-

carolina/21836235/ [https://perma.cc/9PA5-JW6T] (ordering Uber to cease and desist operations in
South Carolina until a regulatory determination has been made); Katherine Driessen, Ride-Share
Operators Gain Access to Houston Airports; City Becomes Third in U.S. to Adopt Rules for AppBased
Services,
Hous.
CHRONICLE
(Nov.
13,
2014),
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/transportation/article/Ride-share-operators-gain-prizedaccess-to-5889267.phpat [https://perma.cc/F6WX-3YGJ].
200.
Rachel Weiner, Virginia Tries to Put Brakes on Ride-Sharing Services, WASH. POST,
(June 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/2014/06/26/65d83a3e-fc85-11e3blf4-8e77c632c07b story.html [https://perma.cc/EY8B-TQ45].
201.
Sarah Perez, Luxury Car-Sharing Service HiGear Shuts Down Due to Theft.
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 1, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/01/luxury-car-sharingservice-higearshuts-down-due-to-theft/ [https://perma.cc/E29F-XAZJ].
202.
Id.
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also possible for people wanting to commit fraud to take control of a
current account (likely through the bulk purchase of hacked passwords)
and make false listings under an unsuspecting user's name.
While platforms deter fraud based on peer-reviews and the fact
that the payments are typically only transferred to the microbusiness
after a transaction is complete. However, there is no regulatory check
on whether these systems are effective and remedies for individuals
hurt by sharing economy fraud are typically limited to traditional
common law tort claims.
The widespread collection and use of data helps expand the
array of services available in the sharing economy and keeps prices low.
Data about interactions is also what facilitates the reputational
feedback mechanisms that are crucial for the development of trust
among diverse and physically distant parties. As the sharing economy
becomes more embedded in how people work, travel, and shop, the
"digital exhaust" from those actions creates associations and patterns
that may be mined for insight, efficiencies, or more nefarious
purposes. 203
Currently, there are no specific privacy laws related to sharing
economy platforms. 204 Therefore, contract law plays a key role and,
typically, platforms dictate the privacy terms because consumers have
no individual bargaining power. 205 Uber's privacy policy states that the
app can gather and use users' geo-location data for a variety of
purposes, including "internal business purposes" even when the app is
turned off. 2 0 6 The privacy policy, however, does not define what these
purposes are. So far, the company has reportedly used it for tracking
Alex Howard, The Sharing Economy: Will Self-Regulation by Startups Suffice to
203.
Protect Consumers? TECHREPUBLIC (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/thesharing-economy-will-self-regulation-by-startups-suffice-to-protect-consumers/
[https://perma.cc/9BEG-2QQB].
See Stemler, supra note 131.
204.
2015),
15,
(July
UBER
Statement,
Privacy
e.g.,
User
See,
205.
[https://perma.ce/UF56-W5SC]. Privacy experts
https://www.uber.com/legal/privacy/users/en/
have also explained that Uber's data collection practices are excessive. Marc Rotenberg, the
President of EPIC, and Julia Horwitz, Consumer Privacy Director at EPIC, previously warned:
"The app model is also a data vacuum, gathering detailed information about users and drivers that
that the company controls. Much of the data collection is excessive. For example, [. . .] the Uber
privacy policy also reveals that the company collects the IP addresses, manufacturers, and
operating systems of users' phones. Uber collects information about the mobile web browsers used
by its customers, exchanges data with advertisers, and tracks users across the Internet." Julia
Horwitz & Marc Rotenberg, Privacy Rules for Uber, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 12, 2014, (updated
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julia-horwitz/privacy-rules-for2015)
11,
Feb.
uber_b_6304824.html Fhttps://perma.cc/36SV-9H65].
User Privacy Statement, supra note 205; Sabreena Khalid, Privacy Concerns in the
206.
17,
2014),
(Dec.
DIGEST
JOLT
TECH:
J.L.
&
HARV.
Sharing Economy,
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/telecommunications/privacy-concerns-in-the-sharing-economythe-case-of-uber [https://perma.cc/HT52-4WJM].
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thirty of its most "notable users" to display an activity map at a launch
party. It is reported that these users did not know their location
coordinates were being used in such a way. 2 0 7 The Washington Post
also reported that an Uber job applicant was able to access the
company's internal analytics and find the location of a politician in
DC. 208

The fear of improper use of personal data is understandable and
warranted.
Sharing economy data could be used for a variety of
improper purposes, including corporate espionage and manipulation of
regulators. And the only real legal limitation on platforms with regard
to these one-sided terms comes from Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce." 209 Recently, a complaint was filed with the
FTC under Section 5 against Uber. 2 10 The complaint asks the FTC to
investigate Uber's business practices and to stop the company from
collecting unnecessary location data under claims of "unfairness." 2 1
However, this complaint is the first of its kind, and it is unclear whether
or not the FTC will take it seriously.
2. Negative Externalities
Similar to the contracts of adhesion entered into by consumers
in the sharing economy, the microbusinesses participating in the
sharing economy have limited bargaining power vis-a-vis the platforms.
Most platforms in the sharing economy do not offer benefits or
protections for microbusinesses because they view microentrepreneurs
as independent contractors. Therefore, microbusinesses receive no paid

207.
Khalid, supra note 206.
208.
Craig Timberg, Is Uber's Rider Databasea Sitting Duck for Hackers?, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/12/01/is-ubers-riderdatabase-a-sitting-duck-for-hackers/ [https://perma.cc/AEM3-D7BM].
209.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). The FTC formalized its process for dealing with unfairness
claims in its 1984 Policy Statement on Unfairness and noted, "To justify a finding of unfairness the
injury must satisfy three tests. It must be substantial; it must not be outweighed by any
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces; and it must be an
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sick or vacation days, 401(k) plans, health insurance or life insurance.
As a result, workers must pay for their own benefits or do without them.
Although the Affordable Care Act does provide new avenues for
independent contractors to access and afford health insurance,
independent contractors will likely still pay more than traditional
employees pay for healthcare subsidized by their employers.2 12 As for
protections, there are no protections for microbusinesses with regard to
discrimination, on-the-job injuries, minimum wage, or collective
bargaining. 2 13 These issues are currently being litigated in court as
many microbusinesses are trying to claim "employee" protections.
3. Anticompetitive Behavior
Traditional businesses that compete with sharing economy
networks often argue that by avoiding the costs associated with
obtaining permits and complying with other regulations that bind their
competitors, sharing businesses can operate at lower costs. 2 14 In
addition, some argue that the sharing economy platforms are price
fixing by telling the individual businesses within the sharing economy
what price they can charge. 215 The regulatory response to these claims
of anticompetitive behavior has generally involved revising state or
local antitrust laws and permitting laws to apply to sharing
networks. 216 The sharing economy's "disruptive innovation" 217 has

212.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
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213.

SharingEconomy Is Turning More and More Workers into "IndependentContractors,"
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214.
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ECONOMIST (US), Apr. 26, 2014, at 61.
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shaken existing industries to their core 218 and has, in the words of
Nathan Cortez, created a "regulatory disruption." 2 19
E. Regulating the Sharing Economy with Regulation 2.0
Regulation 2.0 allows for sharing economy stakeholders to
develop performance standards and enforce them via lex informatica,
which can instantaneously guide and punish user behavior via code.
Regulation 2.0 for the sharing economy requires a three-step process.
Step one identifies sharing economy companies and key stakeholders
within those sharing markets. Step two involves the collaborative
development of performance standards. Step three requires effective
auditing and enforcement of those performance standards.
1. Identifying Sharing Economy Companies and Market Stakeholders
Much of the regulation in the sharing markets will apply,
specifically to platforms, which act as coordinating intermediaries. The
platforms will not be hard to identify as they will be the ones facilitating
transactions, performing key business functions such as market
analysis, advertising, streamline contracts, and monitoring and
sanctioning behavior of businesses within the network.
These
platforms should not be considered employers. Instead, regulators
would be well advised to develop specific regulations to provide basic
employment benefits to microentrepreneurs. Additional stakeholders
within the sharing economy include government regulators (federal,
state, and local), consumers, traditional industry participants, and
microentrepreneurs.
2. Collaborative Development of Performance Standards
Regulation 2.0 performance standards need to be developed in a
collaborative manner, with various stakeholders taking a seat at the
table. Once seated, the group can begin to think about the various
market failures within the sharing economy (asymmetric information,
negative externalities, and anticompetitive behavior) and how to fix
them. The beautiful thing about performance standards is that they
can be simple, quick, and flexible. Participants can devise simple and
challenging standards such as: "complete consumer protection from

218.
Morgan Brown, Uber-What's Fueling Uber's Growth Engine?, GROWTHHACKERS,
https://growthhackers.com/growth-studies/uber [https://perma.cc/9N9E-UVYP] (last visited Nov.
24, 2014).
219.
Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 177
(2014).
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unauthorized data hacks by 2020;" "one-hundred percent of user
feedback must be authentic (i.e. platforms must prevent bot and
confederate reviews);" and "one-hundred percent of services, spaces,
and assets offered must be provided by legitimate and safe users." It
would then be up to the platforms and other relevant participants to
innovate and determine how to achieve those goals. If achievement of
a certain performance standard proves unduly burdensome or
unnecessary, the group can discuss and revise the standards. However,
achieving challenging performance standards should be more feasible
than ever with the help of lex informatica-regulators can
collaboratively set expectations and have the expertise of industry
figure out how to meet them.
While this approach might appear to be idealistic, compare it to
design standards that are much more complicated to develop and that
dictate exactly what a regulated entity must do in order to comply. If
stakeholders have disagreements about what the various performance
standards should be, the final authority will always rest with the
regulators, who can learn from the consistent feedback and monitoring
made possible by the incorporation of lex informatica. Furthermore, if
agreed upon performance standards can be met by platforms,
incumbent industries will have no legitimate reason to be dissatisfied,
and will need to embrace the more effective ways of doing business in
order to stay relevant.
3. Auditing and Enforcing Performance Standards
Self-regulation was a viable means of regulating the e-commerce
for several reasons: the Internet's a-territorial nature, issues of
technical expertise and access, and the decentralized structure of
Internet activities. 220 The sharing economy shares many of these same
characteristics. The platforms, while they facilitate on-the-ground
transactions, are certainly ubiquitous and a-territorial. The platforms
also have the technical expertise and access to sharing systems that
governments do not.
And the relationship between platforms,
microbusinesses, and consumers is certainly decentralized. Thus, selfregulatory approaches might also work well for the sharing economy, if
appropriate performance standards are set.
Other scholars agree. In fact, most proposals by scholars rely on
some form of self-regulation made possible by reputation systems. 22 1
BONNICI, supra note 98, at 202.
220.
See generally Andrew T. Bond, An App for That: Local Governments and the Rise of
221.
the Sharing Economy, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REv 77, 94 (2015); (discussing how sharing economy
entrants should face minimal regulatory requirements because reputational incentives require
firms to constantly seek ways to satisfy rapidly evolving consumer demands and to gain (and keep)
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For example NYU Stern Professor Arun Sundararajan argues that the
creation of trust in the sharing economy through reputation systems,
technology, and corporate branding can solve (or at least begin to solve)
market failures. 222 More optimistically, a team of researchers at the
Mercatus Center argues that reputation systems effectively solve the
problem of asymmetrical information and obviate the need for
traditional regulations. 223 However, regulators must take an active role
in auditing self-regulatory approaches and enforcing performance
standards. They need to understand the lex informatica that governs
these systems and be ready to question consumer-unfriendly business
practices by platforms. For example, reputation systems are only as
good as the information fed into them. Feedback loop failure can occur
thereby distorting the risk calculation for participants and perhaps
compromising the system as a whole. 22 4

Data analytics can be used to measure and analyze compliance.
Both regulators and platforms must develop the capability to accurately
assess the data. For example, Uber relies on big data and technology
to match driver and passenger locations, control payments, and
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CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 23, 27 (2015) (arguing that co-regulatory approaches-a regulatory method
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for regulating the sharing economy); Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and
Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 117 (2015)
(arguing how self-regulation via reputation mechanisms can support sharing economy regulation

and correct for information asymmetries); Dyal-Chand, supra note 137, at 259 (proposing a coregulatory approach based on the unique characteristics of sharing economy platforms, which
relies on monitoring of relational contracting within sharing networks for self-regulation);
Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We
Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, STANFORD TECH. L.R. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing
that a flexible regulatory framework that embraces the "efficiencies" of the sharing
economy-including the reputational feedback mechanisms-is necessary); Ranchordas, supra
note 63, at 466 (describing how regulators must develop innovation friendly policies for the sharing
economy,
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andReputationalFeedbackMechanismsSolve theLemonsProblem [https://perma.ce/Y4ZC82HN] (arguing that the sharing economy, through the use of the internet and real time
reputational feedback mechanisms is providing a solution to the lemons problem (asymmetrical
information), and thus the sharing economy does not need traditional regulator approaches).
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evaluate driver behavior. Uber can accurately and seamlessly measure
safety, pricing, and quality of service-the goals at the heart of taxi
regulation. Regulators, however, must have access to this data, or
various performance measures to assess whether Uber is truly
protecting consumer safety and privacy.
Regulators also have to be aware that self-regulatory
approaches are often lamented as a face-saving tool for industry, since
it largely permits the wolf to guard the sheep. 225 Therefore, regulators
should be ready for likely pushback from sharing economy corollaries.
Furthermore, industry newcomers might view self-regulation as a
cartel-like effort by dominant players to erect barriers to market entry
This viewpoint is likely to be
resulting in market-capture. 22 6
particularly true in the sharing economy as major players, such as Uber
and Airbnb, are highly competitive and tend to dominate the market.
Regulators will need to develop ways to face these challenges by
continuing to collaborate with all stakeholders.
V. CONCLUSION
Regulators will always be confronted with new products,
technologies, and business practices that fall within their jurisdiction
but do not fit comfortably within their existing regulatory frameworks.
These new innovations will likely create the same market failures as
preceding innovations: asymmetric information, negative externalities,
and anticompetitive behavior. In the face of platform-driven regulatory
disruption and market failure, regulators should utilize Regulation 2.0
to collaborate with stakeholders to develop effective technology-driven
performance standards that are appropriately audited and enforced by
regulators. By embracing such standards, companies will be able to
instantaneously monitor, prohibit, and punish behavior that puts
consumers at risk and violates existing regulations. This approach is
friendly to innovation and is transparent and flexible in a way that
Regulation 1.0 cannot be. Mediated through technology, Regulation 2.0
holds great potential to help regulators meaningfully collaborate with
stakeholders and complete the heavy lifting required to effectively turn
code into law and efficiently achieve the desired ends of regulation.
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